How Reform-Friendly Are U.S. Tax Treaties? by Shaheen, Fadi
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 41
Issue 3 SYMPOSIUM: Reconsidering the Tax Treaty Article 11
2016
How Reform-Friendly Are U.S. Tax Treaties?
Fadi Shaheen
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Part of the International Law Commons, Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Fadi Shaheen, How Reform-Friendly Are U.S. Tax Treaties?, 41 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2016).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol41/iss3/11
HOW REFORM-FRIENDLY ARE U.S. TAX
TREATIES?
Fadi Shaheen*
INTRODUCTION........................................................................ 1244
I. THE “RELIEF FROMDOUBLE TAXATION” ARTICLE OFU.S.
TREATIES................................................................................. 1251
A. Article 23 of the U.S. Model Treaty ............................... 1252
B. The Meaning of “Credit” and the “General Principle” of
Article 23(2) ........................................................................ 1256
II. TREATY COMPATIBILITY OF REFORM PROPOSALS ............. 1267
A. Exemption....................................................................... 1267
1. Exemption Systems .................................................... 1267
2. A Move to an Exemption System............................... 1273
3. The Camp Proposal..................................................... 1276
B. Intracategory Combinations of Exemption and Credit 1278
C. Variations on Intracategory Combinations of Exemption
and Credit ........................................................................... 1281
1. Global Minimum Tax—Option Y ............................... 1282
2. Minimum Tax Variations—the Altshuler and Grubert
Proposal........................................................................... 1283
3. Reduced Rate with Partial Credit—the Obama
Administration Proposal ................................................ 1284
4. Reduced Rate Deductibility and Shaviro’s Proposal. 1285
D. Full Rate Deductibility .................................................. 1289
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. This paper was pre-
pared for a symposium titled “Reconsidering the Tax Treaty” that was held at
Brooklyn Law School on October 23, 2015. For helpful comments or discussion,
I thank Reuven Avi-Yonah, Yariv Brauner, Ehab Farah, Alan Hyde, Yutaka
Kitamura, Ruth Mason, Chrystin Ondersma, David Rosenbloom, Leslie Sam-
uels, Daniel Shaviro, Alvin Warren, and participants in the symposium and in
the faculty colloquium at Rutgers Law School in Newark. All remaining errors
are mine.
1244 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:3
III. WHO CARES ANYWAY?...................................................... 1289
CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 1292
INTRODUCTION
he United States taxes the worldwide income of its citi-
zens, tax residents, and domestic corporations (collec-
tively, “U.S. taxpayers”)1 and allows a credit for foreign taxes
paid on foreign-source income.2 To that end, a tentative (pre-
credit) U.S. tax liability is calculated based on the taxpayer’s
worldwide income that is determined on a before-foreign-tax ba-
sis, and a limited credit for foreign taxes is then allowed against
the tentative U.S. tax liability.3 As a result, only a residual U.S.
tax is paid, but no refund is granted for excess foreign tax pay-
ments. Along with foreign taxes directly paid, creditable foreign
taxes of a domestic corporate taxpayer include foreign taxes paid
by an at-least-10-percent-owned foreign corporation on the in-
come underlying dividend distributions by the foreign corpora-
tion to the U.S. corporation.4 The effect is that a corporate U.S.
taxpayer is allowed an indirect foreign tax credit in addition to
the direct foreign tax credit allowed to all U.S. taxpayers.
The United States is committed to allowing direct and indirect
foreign tax credits not only statutorily but also through the
many bilateral income tax treaties it entered into with trading
partners, virtually all of which include an article that is identical
1. I.R.C. §§ 1, 2(d), 11(a), 11(d), 61–63, 7701(a)(30). Generally, tax resi-
dents include “green card” holders and aliens meeting a “substantial presence”
test, and domestic corporations are corporations created or organized in the
United States or under its federal or state laws. I.R.C. § 7701(b), 7701(a)(3)–
(4).
2. I.R.C. §§ 901–909. The foreign tax credit is elective, and taxpayers may
choose to take a foreign tax deduction instead, which treats foreign taxes paid
as a regular and deductible cost of doing business abroad. I.R.C. §§ 901(a),
164(a)(3), 275(a)(4).
3. I.R.C. §§ 901, 904. If, for example, a U.S. taxpayer subject to a 35 percent
U.S. tax rate earns $100 of foreign-source income that is subject to a 20 percent
foreign tax, the taxpayer’s tentative U.S. tax liability is $35 (35% X $100). A
foreign tax credit for the $20 (20% X $100) of foreign taxes paid is then applied
against the $35 tentative U.S. tax liability for a final U.S. tax liability of $15
($35 - $20).
4. I.R.C. §§ 902, 960, 78.
T
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or very similar to Article 23 of the U.S. Model Treaty.5 Under
Article 23, each treaty partner commits to its method of relief
from double taxation, which in the case of the United States is
the foreign-tax-credit (or credit) method.6 Limitations aside, a
foreign tax credit reduces, dollar for dollar, the home country tax
liability by foreign taxes paid. The dollar-for-dollar credit has
been the understood meaning of the foreign tax credit since its
invention by T.S. Adams in 1918,7 through the 1923 League of
5. See U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 23 (U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY 2016) [hereinafter U.S. MODEL TREATY], and identical or similar ar-
ticles in previous U.S. model treaties (for example, the 2006, 1996, and 1981
U.S. Model Treaties) and in actual U.S. treaties. Generally, countries enter
into income tax treaties for the stated purpose of avoiding double taxation and
preventing fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Tax treaties are usu-
ally organized as follows. After the definitional and general articles on the
scope of the treaty (as generally applying to “residents” of one or both signato-
ries, as defined in the treaty) and the taxes covered, the substantive articles of
the treaty allocate the taxing rights between the signatories, mainly with re-
spect to income derived by a resident of one state (the residence country) from
sources within the other state (the source country). With the residence country
generally maintaining its right to tax its residents, the substantive articles lay
out the extent to which the source country may or may not tax types of income
of residents of the other state. Generally, source countries have a right to tax
business income of residents of the other state only to the extent attributable
to a “permanent establishment” of the taxpayer in the source country. The
source country’s rights to tax non-business investment income of a resident of
the other state vary, depending on the treaty and on the type of income. Usu-
ally, such non-business investment income is either exempt or taxed at a re-
duced rate by the source country. A relief-from-double-taxation article usually
completes the picture by imposing the obligation to prevent double taxation on
the residence country. The most common ways to relieve double taxation are
exemption from residence-country taxation, foreign tax credit, or a combina-
tion of both, but certain treaties provide for foreign tax deductibility instead.
U.S. treaties include a limitation-on-benefits article mainly aimed at prevent-
ing “treaty shopping.” Most treaties include a nondiscrimination article, along
with articles providing for dispute resolution procedures, administrative assis-
tance, and exchange of information.
6. Id.
7. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of
U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1045 (1997).
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Nations Report on Double Taxation8 and, at least in the treaty
context, until this day.9
Recent proposals for reforming the U.S. international tax sys-
tem, however, deviate from the classic worldwide or credit fea-
tures of the system and raise the question of whether and to
what extent such proposals are treaty compatible.10 For exam-
ple, the 2011 and 2014 proposals by then-Chairman David Camp
of the House Ways and Means Committee generally would ex-
empt from U.S. taxation 95 percent of repatriated immobile for-
eign-source business income and disallow any foreign tax credit
or deduction with respect to all such income, with the 5 percent
taxable portion being a proxy for the disallowance of allocable
deductions.11 The 2013 proposal by then-Chairman Max Baucus
8. Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by
Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Na-
tions Doc. E.F.S. 73.F.19 (1923) [hereinafter Report on Double Taxation].
9. See, e.g., REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONALTAXLAW 4, 44 (2015) (describing the foreign tax credit as a dol-
lar-for-dollar reduction in the U.S. tax liability for foreign taxes); DANIEL
SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 11–12, 49 (2014) (describing
the standard foreign tax credit as having a 100 percent “marginal reimburse-
ment rate” (MRR) for foreign taxes and as “a 100 percent, dollar-for-dollar, re-
fund from the U.S. government of its foreign taxes paid.”).
10. Scholarship and commentary that raise the issue of treaty compatibility
of international tax reform proposals include SHAVIRO, supra note 9; Stephen
E. Shay, Theory, Complications, and Policy: Daniel Shaviro’s Fixing U.S. In-
ternational Taxation, 9 JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD. 104, 112–14 (2014); Daniel
Shaviro, Response to Comments on Fixing U.S. International Taxation, 9
JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD. 132, 140–41 (2014) [hereinafter Shaviro, Response];
Martin A. Sullivan, Shaviro’s Fixing U.S. International Taxation, 74 TAX
NOTES INT’L 492 (2014); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Buying into Shaviro’s Anti-FTC
Position?, 73 TAXNOTES INT’L 449 (2014); Daniel Shaviro, The Crossroads Ver-
sus the Seesaw: Getting a “Fix” on Recent International Tax Policy Develop-
ments, 69 TAX L. REV. 1, 22, 35–40 (2015) [hereinafter Shaviro, Crossroads];
Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Relationship Between a Credit and a Deduction for
the Foreign Taxes of Multinational Corporation (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-23, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442306; see also Pekar v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 158,
162–63 (1999); Kappus v. Comm’r, 337 F.3d 1053, 1055–56 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Haver v. Comm’r, 444 F.3d 656, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
11. H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2011
DISCUSSION DRAFT (Comm. Print 2011), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Up-
loadedFiles/Discussion_Draft.pdf; H. COMM. ONWAYS &MEANS, 113TH CONG.,
TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014 DISCUSSION DRAFT 782–855 (Comm. Print 2014),
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Statutory_Text_Tax_Re-
form_Act_of_2014_Discussion_Draft_022614.pdf.
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of the Senate Finance Committee includes two options: the so-
called Option Y and Option Z.12 To ensure a global minimum tax
at a combined rate of at least 80 percent of the U.S. rate on cov-
ered foreign-source business income, Option Y would exempt
such income from U.S. taxation if the income is subject to an ef-
fective foreign tax rate of 80 percent or more of the U.S. rate, but
otherwise would tax such income at 80 percent of the U.S. rate
and allow a full foreign tax credit. Option Z would instead tax 60
percent of covered foreign-source business income at the full
U.S. rate, exempt the remaining 40 percent, and allow a credit
for only 60 percent of the applicable foreign taxes. As part of the
proposed budgets for 2016 and 2017, the Obama administra-
tion’s proposal would impose a per-country residual minimum
tax on covered foreign source business earnings at a rate of 19
percent reduced (but not below zero) by 85 percent of the foreign
effective tax rate.13 To make improvements to the current sys-
tem across many dimensions that include the lockout effect, in-
come shifting, the choice of location, and complexity, Rosanne
Altshuler and Harry Grubert propose the imposition of a 15 per-
cent per-country minimum tax on foreign-source active income
with expensing for real investment in the country and a credit
for the effective foreign tax rate up to the 15 percent threshold.14
They also consider varying the proposal by disallowing the ex-
pensing and/or calculating the minimum tax on an overall, in-
stead of on a country-by-country, basis.15 Finally, as one method
12. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., JCX-15-13,
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE CHAIRMAN’S
STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT OF PROVISIONS TO REFORM INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TAXATION (Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter JCX-15-13], http://images.polit-
ico.com/global/2013/11/19/jct_technical_explanation_of_chairmans_staff_in-
ternational_discussion_d___.pdf.
13. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS (2015) [hereinafter
GENERAL EXPLANATION 2016], http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2017
REVENUE PROPOSALS (2016) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION 2017],
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Ex-
planations-FY2017.pdf.
14. Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of
Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 671,
676–78 (2013).
15. Id.
1248 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:3
for implementing his proposal to set the marginal reimburse-
ment rate for foreign taxes paid on foreign-source income at less
than 100 percent without overburdening such income with do-
mestic taxes, Daniel Shaviro proposes to tax foreign-source busi-
ness income at a reduced U.S. rate and to allow a deduction, not
credit, for foreign taxes paid.16 Shaviro notes that alternative
methods for implementing his proposal include Option Z and the
Obama administration’s proposal.17
This article addresses the treaty compatibility aspect of reform
proposals. Treaty override aside, treaty compatibility is a bar to
the implementation, not enactment, of a domestic tax law.18
That is, being treaty incompatible does not mean that a domestic
tax law cannot be enacted but only that that law would produce
a worse result to a taxpayer than what is allowed under the ap-
plicable treaty. And by claiming treaty benefits, the taxpayer
can achieve the favorable treaty result. Section 871(a)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”)19 is a good example of a
treaty-incompatible provision of U.S. tax law that no one would
raise treaty concerns about. This provision imposes a 30 percent
final withholding tax on certain amounts—including interest,
dividends, and royalties—received from sources within the
United States by a nonresident alien individual. U.S. treaties on
the other hand provide for lower (including zero) tax rate limits
for certain such items, and a taxpayer claiming treaty benefits
would be taxed at the applicable reduced treaty rates, not the 30
percent statutory rate.20 What is the problem then, and what is
the difference, if any, between §871(a)(1), which is incompatible
with treaty rate limits on the one hand, and a reform that would
be incompatible with the treaty credit method (Article 23) on the
16. SHAVIRO, supra note 9.
17. Shaviro, Response, supra note 10, at 140–41; Shaviro, Crossroads, supra
note 10, at 35–40; see also Sullivan, supra note 10.
18. I.R.C. §§ 894(a), 7852(d); see also Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321
(1907) (“Repeals by implication are never favored, and a later treaty will not
be regarded as repealing an earlier statute by implication unless the two are
absolutely incompatible and the statute cannot be enforced without antagoniz-
ing the treaty.” (emphasis added)). Note that Article 23 overrides Article 1(4)
of the U.S. Model Treaty. SeeU.S.MODELTREATY, supra note 5, art 1(5). Article
1(4) is the saving clause, which preserves the right of each treaty partner to
tax its own residents as if the treaty were not in effect.
19. All section and regulation references are to the Code and the regulations
thereunder.
20. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, arts. 10–13.
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other hand? That one is incompatible with a treaty rate limit
while the other is incompatible with a treaty method is inconse-
quential because a rate limit is but a simple method.21 And like
a non-U.S. taxpayer who claims treaty benefits from the United
States as a source country with a tax rate that is higher than
that allowed by a treaty, a U.S. taxpayer can claim treaty bene-
fits from the United States as a residence country if the treaty
credit method produces a better result than that of the U.S. stat-
utory method.22 This is what income tax treaties are meant to
do—guarantee a result, not a method. The problem, however,
lies elsewhere and relates to the purpose of the proposal whose
treaty compatibility is at issue. If, unlike §871(a)(1),23 the pur-
pose of a proposal is to reform the U.S. international tax system,
treaty incompatibility would raise a serious question regarding
the point in and efficacy of a reform that in most cases would be
overridden by existing treaty obligations.24 This issue can be
21. That Articles 10–13 benefit residents of the treaty partner while Article
23 benefits a U.S. resident is also an irrelevant difference.
22. See, e.g., Pekar v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 158 (1999); Kappus v. Comm’r, 337
F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Haver v. Comm’r, 444 F.3d 656 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
23. The 30 percent withholding tax rate of §871(a)(1) could be viewed as an
incentive for non-treaty partners to seek to enter into a treaty with the United
States.
24. For example, when the Belgian courts examined whether Belgium’s re-
placement of its foreign-tax-credit relief for foreign-source dividend income
with a foreign tax deduction, they found that the repeal of the foreign tax credit
was compatible with Belgium’s treaties with the Netherlands, Germany, and
France because these treaties allowed Belgium full autonomy in changing its
internal tax laws in this respect. The courts, however, found that the repeal
did violate Belgium’s treaty with the United States and granted Belgian share-
holders of U.S. companies a treaty credit relief despite the Belgian domestic
law repeal of the foreign tax credit. See Marc Quaghebeur, ECJ Examines, for
the Third Time, Belgian Tax Treatment of French Dividends, 69 TAX NOTES
INT’L 1045, 1048 (2013). Unlike Belgium’s treaties with the Netherlands, Ger-
many, and France, the Belgium-U.S. treaty then in effect provided that Bel-
gium’s obligation to allow a credit was subject to changes of Belgian laws with-
out changing the principle of allowing a credit, which is similar to the U.S.
obligation under Article 23(2) of the U.S. Model Treaty. See Convention Be-
tween the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, Belg.-U.S., art. 23(3)(b), July 9, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2687 (termi-
nated).
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dealt with, however, either by renegotiating or overriding all ex-
isting treaties.25 But, the renegotiation option is an onerous
task,26 and while treaty override is permissible under U.S. law,27
it is a violation of international law.28 Establishing that a reform
proposal is treaty compatible obviates the need for renegotiating
or overriding existing U.S. treaties.
The article is structured as follows. Part I introduces the rele-
vant language of Article 23 of the U.S. Model Treaty and con-
strues its credit principle. Part II.A explains why a U.S. move to
an exemption system would be treaty compatible even under the
most literal and formalistic reading of the treaty language as re-
quiring a credit system. The key is that the treaty language (Ar-
ticle 23) subjects the U.S. obligation to allow a credit to limita-
tions of U.S. law as it may be amended without changing the
“general principle” of allowing a credit. Therefore, this article
argues that exempting foreign-source business income can be co-
ordinated with standard foreign-tax-credit limitations without
violating any treaty or rendering any part of it a surplusage. The
article then explains why the Camp proposal is such an exemp-
tion system and therefore treaty compatible. Part II.B argues
that for the same reasons that an exemption system is treaty
25. For example, a 2013 pending protocol to the Japan-United States 2003
income tax treaty would amend Article 23 of the 2003 treaty to conform it to
Japan’s recent move from a full worldwide system to a business-income and
participation-exemption system. The protocol would replace existing Article
23(1)(b) of the 2003 treaty, which provides that Japan allow indirect foreign
tax credit for dividends received by a Japanese corporation from an at least 10
percent-owned U.S. corporation, with new Article 23(1)(b), which provides for
a participation exemption with respect to such dividends.
26. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 10.
27. SeeU.S.CONST. art. VI, § 2; I.R.C. §§ 894(a), 7852(d); Reuven Avi-Yonah,
Tax Treaty Overrides: A Qualified Defense of US Practice, in TAXTREATIES AND
DOMESTIC LAW 65, 65 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2006); JOHN P. STEINES, JR.,
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF U.S. INCOME TAXATION 271–73 (6th ed. 2015); see
also Shay, supra note 10, at 10–11; infra notes 178–181 and accompanying
discussion.
28. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 26–27, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Avi-Yonah, supra note 27;
STEINES, supra note 27. The United States signed the Vienna Convention on
April 24, 1970 but has not yet ratified it. Nonetheless, the United States con-
siders the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention as codifying cus-
tomary international law on the law of treaties. Avi-Yonah, supra note 27; Mi-
chael S. Kirsch, The Limits of Administrative Guidance in the Interpretation of
Tax Treaties, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1063, 1078 (2009); RebeccaM. Kysar, Interpreting
Tax Treaties, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1387, 1402 (2016).
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compatible, any fixed or floating intra-item combination of ex-
emption and credit, such as Option Z, is also treaty compatible
and that this approach has been implemented in U.S. tax law for
more than twenty-five years. Building on Alvin Warren’s credit
and deduction interchangeability analysis,29 Part II.C algebrai-
cally demonstrates through a uniform method that each of the
Option Y, Obama administration, and Altshuler and Grubert
proposals is a perfect floating combination of exemption and full
credit. Applying the same method, this article also demonstrates
that while reduced rate deductibility cannot be expressed as a
perfect combination of exemption and credit, Shaviro’s proposal
can be implemented through various treaty-compatible combi-
nations of exemption and credit. Part III explains why it is un-
likely that taxpayers or treaty partners would object to the en-
actment of any of the proposals, even if they were not treaty com-
patible.
Warren’s analysis focuses on the conditions under which a
credit and a deduction for foreign taxes are interchangeable, and
allows for partial creditability (less than dollar-for-dollar credit).
Following a similar methodology, the analysis here focuses on
the interchangeability between combinations of exemption and
full credit on the one hand and other structures on the other
hand, but without allowing for partial credit. The importance of
exemption and full credit combinations for treaty purposes is in
that such combinations preserve the general principle of dollar-
for-dollar credit for foreign taxes against the U.S. tax on foreign-
source income, which, as explained below, is the key for treaty
compatibility. The general argument is that any system that is
or can be expressed as an outright fixed or floating combination
of exemption and credit is treaty compatible regardless of how it
is actually labeled or expressed. That is so because, as explained
below, even under a literal and formalistic application of trea-
ties, such systems would comply with Article 23’s requirement
not to change the general principle of allowing a credit.
I. THE “RELIEF FROMDOUBLE TAXATION” ARTICLE OFU.S.
TREATIES
After introducing the relief-from-double-taxation language of
Article 23 of the U.S. Model Treaty and framing the treaty-com-
patibility question addressed in this article, this Part turns to
29. Warren, Jr., supra note 10.
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understanding the meaning of the terms “credit” and “general
principle” of Article 23(2). As will become clearer, interpreting
these terms is central to resolving the main treaty-compatibility
question of this article.
A. Article 23 of the U.S. Model Treaty
Virtually all U.S. income tax treaties include an article that is
identical or very similar to Article 23 of the U.S. Model Treaty,30
which provides, in pertinent part:
Relief From Double Taxation
1. In the case of [Country X], double taxation will be relieved
as follows:
2. In accordance with the provisions and subject to the limi-
tations of the law of the United States (as it may be amended
from time to time without changing the general principle
hereof), the United States shall allow to a resident or citizen of
the United States as a credit against the United States tax on
income applicable to residents and citizens:
a) the income tax paid or accrued to [Country X] by or on be-
half of such resident or citizen; and
b) in the case of a United States company owning at least 10
percent of the voting stock of a company that is a resident of
[Country X] and from which the United States company re-
ceives dividends, the income tax paid or accrued to [Country X]
by or on behalf of the payer with respect to the profits out of
which the dividends are paid . . . .
3. For the purposes of applying paragraph 2 of this Article, an
item of gross income, as determined under the laws of the
United States, derived by a resident of the United States that,
under this Convention, may be taxed in [Country X] shall be
deemed to be income from sources in [Country X] . . . .
In Article 23(2), the United States undertakes to allow direct
and indirect foreign tax credits subject to existing limitations of
U.S. law as may be amended without changing the general prin-
ciple of the Article. This qualification opens the door for possible
deviations from the standard credit system, and the question is
how far one can go.
30. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 23.
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Consistent with the language of Article 23(2), courts have
found Code limitations on the foreign tax credit to be treaty com-
patible when the limitations existed at the time a treaty with
language similar to that of Article 23(2) was entered into,31 but
have left unresolved the treaty-compatibility question of limita-
tions introduced by later Code amendments.32 It was unneces-
sary for the courts to resolve this question in the cases they dis-
cussed because they concluded that, even if a conflict had existed
between the treaty and the subsequent Code provision, the Code
provision would have overridden the treaty under the later-in-
time rule.33 But, treaty override seems to be permissible under
U.S. law “only where the subsequent Code provision itself or ac-
companying legislative history clearly states an intent to over-
ride,”34 and even then, treaty override remains a violation of in-
ternational law.35 As noted, however, establishing that a reform
proposal is treaty compatible obviates the need to override or re-
negotiate existing U.S. treaties. Again, the key for treaty com-
patibility of subsequent Code provisions is the language of Arti-
cle 23(2), which subjects the U.S. obligation to allow a credit to
limitations of U.S. law as may be amended without changing the
“general principle hereof.”36
The first question to address in this respect is whether the
term “hereof” refers to the treaty in general, to Article 23 in gen-
eral, or to Article 23(2) in particular. The general principle of the
31. Pekar v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 158 (1999) (finding that a foreign tax credit
limitation in the Code is treaty compatible because it existed when the treaty,
with language similar to that of Article 23, was entered into); see also Haver v.
Comm’r, 444 F.3d 656, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that for a treaty to over-
ride a foreign tax credit limitation of U.S. law that existed when the treaty was
entered into, “the treaty would have to indicate that the contracting parties
intended to override inconsistent portions of U.S. law.”).
32. Haver, 444 F.3d at 659 (“Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to decide
what more might have been contemplated by the provision in Article 23[(2)]
that conditions the tax credit on limitations of U.S. law ‘as it may be amended
from time to time without changing the general principles’ of the Treaty. Nor
need we ponder whether the United States may effectively abrogate the Treaty
by enacting legislation that cannot be reconciled with the Treaty.”); Kappus v.
Comm’r, 337 F.3d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The question of whether the
Treaty and statute can be harmonized as the government suggests is an ex-
tremely close one. It is not, however, a question that we need resolve.”).
33. Haver, 444 F.3d; Kappus, 337 F.3d.
34. STEINES, supra note 27, at 272.
35. Id.; Avi-Yonah, supra note 27.
36. Pekar, 113 T.C.; Kappus, 337 F.3d; Haver, 444 F.3d.
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treaty is its stated principle or purpose that is “the elimination
of double taxation with respect to taxes on income without cre-
ating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through
tax evasion or avoidance.”37 As Article 23 and its title seem to
indicate, the general principle of Article 23 is the relief from dou-
ble taxation.38 Relief from double taxation is a broader principle
than that of the treaty, which includes the qualifier “without cre-
ating opportunities for non-taxation etc.” Attaching significance
to the difference between the terms “relief” and “elimination”
would further narrow down the treaty principle. Arguably, be-
cause the general principle of a treaty article cannot coherently
be broader than the general principle of the treaty itself, there
is good basis for the argument that the general principle of Arti-
cle 23 should be limited to that of the treaty.39 It is not necessary,
however, to resolve this issue because, in any event, the “general
principle hereof” refers to neither of these two principles, but to
the narrower general principle of Article 23(2), which obviously
is the allowance of a credit. First, the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment’s (the Treasury) Model Technical Explanation (the “Model
Technical Explanation”)—which the Treasury follows in its ac-
tual technical explanations of actual U.S. tax treaties—makes it
unequivocally clear that the term “general principle hereof” re-
fers to the general principle of the allowance of a credit;40 and
37. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5 (introductory paragraph).
38. See id. art. 23.
39. Vienna Convention, supra note 28, art. 31(1), which provides that “[a]
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose” (emphasis added). See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International
Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483, 491–93 (2004).
40. U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE U.S. MODEL
INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 23(2) (U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY 2006) [hereinafter MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION],
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16802.pdf
(“The credits allowed under paragraph 2 are allowed in accordance with the
provisions and subject to the limitations of U.S. law, as that law may be
amended over time, so long as the general principle of the Article, that is, the
allowance of a credit, is retained.” (emphasis added)). As of the writing of this
article, the Treasury Department has not yet released the Technical Explana-
tion of the 2016 U.S. Model Treaty, but no material updates, if any, to the 2006
Model Technical Explanation are expected with respect to Article 23, whose
language is identical in both models. See PREAMBLE TO 2016 U.S. MODEL
INCOME TAXCONVENTION (U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 2016) [hereinafter 2016
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“[i]t is well settled that the Executive Branch’s interpretation of
a treaty ‘is entitled to great weight.’”41 This is all the more so
true here, where the Treasury’s interpretation of the term at is-
sue is the most restrictive interpretation for the United States.42
Second, interpreting the term “general principle hereof” as re-
ferring to the general principle of Article 23(2) is the most sensi-
ble interpretation. That is so because, regardless of how restric-
tive this interpretation is for the United States, the term “gen-
eral principle hereof” is used in Article 23(2) in the context of the
allowance of a credit, and it makes the most sense for the term
“hereof” to refer to the particular paragraph in which it is used,
especially where the general principle of Article 23(2)—that is,
the allowance of a credit—is a subset of the broader general prin-
ciple of Article 23 or of the treaty. Third, the only actual U.S.
treaty that defines the term “general principle hereof” for pur-
poses of the equivalent of Article 23(2) is the U.S.-Germany
treaty,43 which provides that the term refers to the “avoidance of
double taxation by allowing a credit.”44
PREAMBLE], https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Doc-
uments/Preamble-US%20Model-2016.pdf.
41. Abbot v. Abbot, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010); see alsoKolovrat v. Oregon,
81 S. Ct. 922, 926 (1961) (“While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the
meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.”); Garcia v.
Comm’r, 140 T.C. 141, 160 (“Petitioner agrees with respondent that the Treas-
ury Technical Explanation is useful in interpreting the Swiss Tax Treaty, and
we concur.”); cf. Kirsch, supra note 28.
42. A reference in Article 23(2) to broader general principles—e.g., relief
from double taxation—would allow the United States more flexibility in
amending its internal tax laws without violating Article 23(2).
43. Convention Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain
Other Taxes, Ger.-U.S., Aug. 29, 1989, 1708 U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended) [herein-
after U.S.-Germany Treaty].
44. Id. Protocol art. 19. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals in Haver v.
Comm’r, 444 F.3d 656, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006) referred to the “general principle
hereof” of Article 23(1) of the U.S.-Germany treaty (which is the equivalent of
Article 23(2) of the Model Treaty) as referring to the “‘general principles [sic]’
of the Treaty.” This statement is of no significance for our purposes. First, the
statement was made incidentally in a dictum and without any substantiation
or reasoning. Second, if the court understood the term “general principle
hereof” of Article 23(1) of the U.S.-Germany treaty to refer to the general prin-
ciple of the treaty rather than that of Article 23(1) of that treaty, then the court
must have overlooked the clear definition to the contrary in the protocol to the
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Therefore, we will proceed with the notion that the term “gen-
eral principle hereof” refers to the general principle of Article
23(2) that is the principle of allowing a credit. Note that because
this interpretation is the most restrictive interpretation for the
United States,45 other interpretations of the term would make
the case of this article easier.
B. The Meaning of “Credit” and the “General Principle” of Arti-
cle 23(2)
Recall that in Article 23(2), the United States undertakes to
allow a “credit” subject to limitations of U.S. law, as may be
amended without changing the general principle of allowing a
credit. The term “credit” is not defined in the U.S. Model Treaty
or in actual U.S. treaties, and Article 3(2) of the U.S. Model
Treaty, which is included in all U.S. tax treaties, provides that,
unless the context requires otherwise, any term not defined in a
treaty shall have the meaning it has at that time under the in-
ternal laws (primarily tax laws) of the treaty partner with re-
spect to whose taxes the treaty is being applied—here, the
United States.46 The unless-the-context-requires-otherwise
qualifier is meant to address the concern that “[t]he use of ‘am-
bulatory’ definitions . . . may lead to results that are at variance
with the intentions of the negotiators and of the Contracting
treaty. What is more is that the court even misread the term to include “prin-
ciples” in plural, which might have misled the court in presuming that, while
Article 23(1) has one general principle, the treaty had several ones.
45. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Estate of Burghardt v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 705, 711–13 (1983).
The language of Article 3(2) of the U.S. Model Treaty is as follows:
As regards the application of the Convention at any time by
a Contracting State any term not defined therein shall, un-
less the context otherwise requires, or the competent author-
ities agree to a common meaning pursuant to the provisions
of Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure), have the mean-
ing which it has at that time under the law of that State for
the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies,
any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State pre-
vailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of
that State.
U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 3(2).
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States when the treaty was negotiated and ratified.”47 This con-
cern, however, is not present here because, as explained below,
the concepts and principles underlying the current meaning of
the foreign tax credit and its limitations under U.S. law predate
the first treaty in which the United States started using a vari-
ation of the modern language of Article 23 that is now used in
virtually all U.S. treaties.48Because, therefore, the context of Ar-
ticle 23(2) does not require otherwise, and because, as a more
specific rule of interpretation,49 Article 3(2) prevails over the Vi-
enna Convention general rules of interpreting treaties,50 the
term “credit” should have the meaning it has under U.S. tax law.
Note that there is also no policy rationale against this interpre-
tation of the term “credit.” The policy argument against inter-
preting treaty terms according to the domestic laws of the coun-
try applying the treaty is meant to address the concern that
treaty partners with different internal laws would apply the
same treaty provision differently.51 But, by its terms, Article
23(2) may be applied only by the United States, not by the other
treaty partner, and therefore, this concern is not present here.
Limitations aside, a credit reduces, dollar for dollar, the U.S.
tax liability by foreign taxes paid. The dollar-for-dollar reduction
in the U.S. tax for foreign taxes paid has been the U.S. (and
global) understanding of the foreign tax credit since its invention
by T.S. Adams in 1918,52 through the 1923 League of Nations
47. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 40, art. 3(2).
48. Convention Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Norway for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, Nor.-U.S., Dec. 3,
1971, 23 U.S.T. 2832 [hereinafter U.S.-Norway Treaty].
49. Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT’L TAX
&BUS. LAW 1,70 (1986); F. Engelen & A. Gunn, Article 3(2) of the OECDModel
Tax Convention and the Scope of Domestic Law, 66 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N
(2012).
50. Vienna Convention, supra note 28, arts. 31–33. Even if the Vienna Con-
vention were to apply here, Article 31(1) would provide that “[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose” (emphasis added), which would bring us back to the context of the allow-
ance of a credit for the purpose of preventing double taxation. Cf. Avi-Yonah,
supra note 39.
51. See Vogel, supra note 49, at 63.
52. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1045.
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Report on Double Taxation,53 and until this day.54 It is also con-
sistent with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) Model Treaty (the “OECD Model Treaty”)
view of credit.55 This is also the clear reading and plain meaning
53. See Report on Double Taxation, supra note 8.
54. See I.R.C § 901 (providing for a dollar-for-dollar credit); see also AVI-
YONAH, supra note 9; SHAVIRO, supra note 9; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH
H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 25, 211 (7th
ed. 2013) (describing a tax credit in general as a dollar-for-dollar credit) (“A
credit represents a direct reduction in tax in the amount of the allowable credit
. . . . [A] dollar of tax credit saves a dollar of taxes.”).
55. MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL
(ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2014) [hereinafter OECD MODEL
TREATY]. The OECDModel Treaty language on methods for eliminating double
taxation includes two alternative articles: Article 23A, which describes the ex-
emption method, see infra note 99 (setting forth the full language of Article
23A) and Article 23B, which describes the credit method. Article 23B provides
as follows:
1. Where a resident of a Contracting State derives income or
owns capital which, in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention, may be taxed in the other Contracting State, the
first-mentioned State shall allow:
a) as a deduction from the tax on the income of that resident,
an amount equal to the income tax paid in that other State;
b) as a deduction from the tax on the capital of that resident,
an amount equal to the capital tax paid in that other State.
Such deduction in either case shall not, however, exceed that
part of the income tax or capital tax, as computed before the
deduction is given, which is attributable, as the case may be,
to the income or the capital which may be taxed in that other
State.
2. Where in accordance with any provision of the Convention
income derived or capital owned by a resident of a Contract-
ing State is exempt from tax in that State, such State may
nevertheless, in calculating the amount of tax on the remain-
ing income or capital of such resident, take into account the
exempted income or capital.
Id. art 23B (emphasis added). Paragraph (1) describes the credit as a deduction
from the home-country pre-credit tax liability of “an amount equal to the in-
come tax paid” to the source country, which is the classic dollar-for-dollar credit
method. The same description of the credit method is also evident in OECD
Article 23A (first sentence of Article 23A(2)), which, as explained in notes 99
and 106 and accompanying text, combines the exemption and credit methods.
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of Article 23(2) or any provision requiring the allowance of a
credit. Interpreting the credit requirement as also allowing a
partial credit (i.e., a credit on less than a dollar-for-dollar basis)
would render Article 23(2), or any provision requiring the allow-
ance of a credit, meaningless. That is so because, as demon-
strated by Warren, any system (including a foreign-tax-deduc-
tion system) could be reconstructed and expressed as a partial
credit system.56
Therefore, but for the limitations, the general credit principle
of Article 23(2) would be stated as the allowance for a reduction
in the U.S. tax liability, dollar for dollar, by foreign taxes paid.
And, as it happened, when the United States first introduced the
foreign tax credit to the world in the Revenue Act of 1918,57 the
credit was unlimited and reduced the U.S. tax liability, dollar for
dollar, by foreign taxes paid.58 Since then, however, several Code
limitations were added. Some of those limitations were added
long before the United States started using the language of Ar-
ticle 23(2) in its treaties. Such preexisting limitations, which by
definition are treaty compatible,59 are instrumental in shaping
the general credit principle of Article 23(2).
The first and most important foreign tax credit limitation is
the so-called “overall limitation.” The Revenue Act of 1921 added
this limitation, which today is codified in §904 of the Code. The
overall limitation restricts the amount of allowable credit for a
taxable year to the taxpayer’s tentative (pre-credit) U.S. tax lia-
bility for the year, multiplied by the ratio of the taxpayer’s taxa-
ble foreign-source income to the taxpayer’s entire (worldwide)
taxable income for that year.60 Excess credits are carried over to
56. SeeWarren, Jr., supra note 10.
57. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1022.
58. Id. at 1045.
59. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
60. Consider, for example, a U.S. taxpayer with $200 of U.S.-source income
and $100 of foreign-source income subject to a 50 percent foreign tax. If the
U.S. tax rate is 35 percent, the taxpayer’s tentative (pre-credit) U.S. tax liabil-
ity is $105 (35% X $300). Under an unlimited foreign tax credit, the $50 of
foreign taxes would be applied against the tentative U.S. tax liability and a
residual U.S. tax of only $55 would be paid ($105 - $50 = $55). The overall
limitation, however, limits the foreign tax credit here to only $35, which is the
product of the $105 tentative U.S. tax liability and the ratio (100/300) of the
taxpayer’s taxable foreign-source income ($100) to the taxpayer’s entire (world-
wide) taxable income ($300). Therefore, the taxpayer would then have a $70
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preceding or succeeding taxable years.61 The overall limitation
is meant to protect the U.S. tax base on U.S.-source income from
erosion by the foreign tax credit.62 It is easier to see how the
overall limitation achieves this objective by algebraically rear-
ranging the limitation formula to cancel out worldwide taxable
income from both the tentative U.S. tax liability multiplier
(which is the product of the U.S. tax rate and worldwide taxable
income) and the denominator of the limitation ratio. This rear-
rangement reduces the limitation formula to the product of the
U.S. tax rate and foreign-source taxable income. This product is
effectively the U.S. tax on taxable foreign-source income. Limit-
ing the credit to the U.S. tax on taxable foreign-source income
keeps the U.S. tax on U.S.-source income unaffected by the
credit or by foreign tax systems.63 To be sure, taxable foreign-
source income refers to foreign-source income that is taxable
from a U.S. perspective. That is, U.S.-exempt foreign-source in-
come is excluded from the limitation formula, reflecting the fact
that such foreign-source income is not subject to U.S. tax against
which a credit could be taken.64
Remaining materially unchanged until this day, the overall
limitation was introduced in 1921, long before the United States
entered into its first ever income tax treaty in 193265 or its first
treaty to include a “relief from double taxation” article in 1939;66
and it was not until 197167 that the United States started using
residual U.S. tax liability ($105 - $35), and $15 excess credit to be carried back
or forward.
61. I.R.C. § 904(c).
62. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 7; John P. Steines, Jr., The Foreign Tax
Credit at Ninety-Five Bionic Centenarian, 66 TAX L. REV. 545, 548 (2013).
63. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-755, at 379 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (“The foreign tax
credit generally is limited to the U.S. tax liability on a taxpayer’s foreign-
source income, in order to ensure that the credit serves the purpose of mitigat-
ing double taxation of foreign-source income without offsetting the U.S. tax on
U.S.-source income.”).
64. Article 23(3) is not relevant here because foreign source exempt income
is excluded from the limitation formula not as artificially resourced as U.S.-
source income but because it is exempt income.
65. Convention and Protocol Between the United States of America and
France Concerning Double Taxation, Fr.-U.S., Apr. 27, 1932, 49 Stat. 3145 (ter-
minated).
66. Convention and Protocol Between the United States of America and
Sweden Respecting Double Taxation, Swed.-U.S., Mar. 23, 1939, 54 Stat. 1759
(terminated).
67. See U.S.-Norway Treaty, supra note 48.
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a variation of the modern language of Article 23 that is now used
in virtually all U.S. treaties. Because Article 23(2) incorporates
preexisting Code limitations into the U.S. treaty obligation to
allow a credit, one cannot really think about the meaning of the
general credit principle of Article 23(2) without considering a
preexisting limitation of such major importance and general ef-
fect as the overall limitation. That the overall limitation became
an integral part of the foreign tax credit is also evidenced by the
OECD Model Treaty language on methods for eliminating dou-
ble taxation, which provides that the credit is limited to the
home-country pre-credit tax on taxable foreign-source income.68
It should be clear by now that Article 23(2)’s general principle
of allowing a credit includes the overall limitation, and can
therefore be narrowed to refer to a dollar-for-dollar reduction in
the amount of U.S. tax on U.S.-taxable foreign-source income by
the amount of foreign taxes paid. To see why the overall limita-
tion merely narrows the general principle of dollar-for-dollar
credit but does not alter its meaning to partial credit, one could
think of a continuum of reasonable dollar-for-dollar foreign-tax-
credit methods, ranging from the strictest nonrefundable, no-
carryover credit applied on a transactional (item-by-item) basis
to the most lenient fully refundable unlimited credit.69 The most
lenient version of the foreign tax credit is familiar: the foreign
tax credit in its original 1918 form. Each dollar of the creditable
foreign taxes would be credited against the taxpayer’s overall
tentative U.S. tax liability, and excess credits would be refunda-
ble by the U.S. government. This is the simplest and clearest
method for implementing a full dollar-for-dollar credit. Restrict-
ing this method a bit and making the credit nonrefundable
would not alter the dollar-for-dollar meaning of the credit. Cred-
itable foreign taxes would still be fully credited against the tax-
payer’s overall tentative U.S. tax liability. The only difference is
that creditable foreign taxes that exceed the tentative U.S. tax
68. OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 55, arts. 23A(2) (second sentence),
23B(1) (flush language), 23B(2).
69. A nonrefundable credit is usable only to the extent of the tax liability
against which the credit is taken. Some credits, such as the foreign tax credit,
allow excess credits to be carried over to, and used in, preceding or succeeding
taxable years. A refundable credit, on the other hand, would entitle the tax-
payer to a refund from the government to the extent the creditable expenditure
(here, foreign taxes paid) exceeds the tax liability against which the credit is
taken.
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liability would not be refunded, and may or may not be carried
over to preceding or succeeding taxable years. In fact, most cred-
its of U.S. tax law are nonrefundable but still maintain their
standard dollar-for-dollar credit meaning,70 which remains true
regardless of the existence or nonexistence of a carryover fea-
ture.71 An unlimited foreign tax credit does not require any cor-
relation between the income on which foreign taxes are paid and
the income triggering the U.S. tax liability against which the
credit is taken.72 Therefore, an unlimited foreign tax credit
would permit cross crediting or foreign-tax averaging.73 Limiting
the foreign tax credit to apply on a transactional basis, however,
would move the credit to its strictest form.74 Such a transac-
tional limitation—which would require full tax-base correlation
between the creditable foreign tax and the U.S. tax liability
70. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 54, at 25 (“A credit represents a direct
reduction in tax in the amount of the allowable credit . . . . Most credits are
nonrefundable, which means they only offset tax liability.”).
71. Id. at 212 (“Some credits can be carried over to a succeeding year.” (em-
phasis added)).
72. Consider a U.S. taxpayer that earns an item of $100 of foreign-source
income (item 1) subject to 50% foreign tax and another item of $100 of foreign-
source income (item 2) subject to 10% foreign tax. With a 35% U.S. tax rate,
the taxpayer’s tentative U.S. tax liability would be $70 (35% X $200). An un-
limited foreign tax credit would allow the taxpayer to use all the $60 of foreign
taxes paid ($50 + $10) as an offset against all the $70 of tentative U.S. tax
liability, even though $15 of the $50 foreign taxes paid on item 1 exceeded the
$35 tentative U.S. tax liability on that item.
73. The taxpayer in the preceding footnote could still use the $15 excess
credit on item 1 as an offset against the tentative U.S. tax liability on item 2
because item 2 was subject to a low effective foreign tax rate. The taxpayer,
therefore, is said to have engaged in cross crediting or in foreign tax credit
averaging.
74. For an item-by-item limitation, or any other limitation on the tax
against which a credit is taken, to be effective, the credit must be nonrefunda-
ble. Imposing a limitation on the tax against which a refundable credit is taken
would be practically meaningless because it would just convert the excess
credit into a refund, effectively producing the same result. Note that in certain
situations the item-by-item limitation might work in favor of the taxpayer. The
main, and probably only, example is a situation in which the taxpayer has sep-
arate foreign-source loss and income items. Foreign-source losses under an
item-by-item limitation would not offset foreign-source income from a different
transaction. Therefore, foreign taxes on the profit transaction would be fully
creditable up to the U.S. tax rate. Under an overall limitation, however, for-
eign-source loss items offset foreign-source income items, thereby reducing the
overall amount of foreign-source income, which in turn reduces the limitation
and, therefore, the foreign tax credit amount. Cf. infra note 86.
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against which a credit would be taken75—would disallow any
sort of cross crediting or averaging.76 This transactional credit
approach is clearly a legitimate dollar-for-dollar credit approach,
and arguably even the most theoretically correct one.77 That is
so because the purpose of the foreign tax credit is to relieve dou-
ble taxation, and the purpose of the limitation is to protect the
U.S. tax base on U.S.-source income, but neither the credit nor
the limitation is meant to encourage one foreign transaction over
another;78 and if, from a nontax perspective each transaction is
evaluated separately, then there should be no averaging or cross
crediting of any kind.79 In fact, several European countries have
75. That is, foreign taxes paid on an item of foreign-source income would be
creditable, dollar for dollar, only against the tentative U.S. tax liability on such
an item.
76. Under a transactional limitation, the taxpayer described in footnote 72
may credit the $50 of foreign taxes on item 1 only against the $35 U.S. tax on
item 1, and the $10 of foreign taxes on item 2 only against the $35 U.S. tax on
item 2. Cross crediting or averaging are not allowed. Therefore, the U.S. tax
liability on item 1 would be eliminated, leaving $15 of nonrefundable excess
credit, and the U.S. tax liability on item 2 would be reduced to $25. The excess
credit on item 1 may or may not be carried over depending on whether the
transaction giving rise to item 1 spans and produces income beyond the taxable
year.
77. See STEINES, supra note 27, at 390 (“In theory, the limitation arguably
should apply separately to each item of foreign source income, on a transaction-
by-transaction basis. But that approach, which would prevent averaging
(‘cross-crediting’) high taxes on one transaction with low taxes on another and
thereby maximize U.S. residual tax, would be hopelessly impractical to admin-
ister.”); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCS-4-09,
DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL
YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL, PART THREE: PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE
TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME AND INVESTMENT 76 (Comm. Print 2009)
(“The U.S. foreign tax credit limitation provisions historically have included
rules that restrict cross-crediting in order to preserve the U.S. tax base. In its
most restrictive (or theoretically purest) form, the limitation would function on
an item-by-item basis, so that foreign tax imposed on any item of income could
offset only the U.S. tax on that item. Historically, however, the actual limita-
tion rules have operated instead with respect to more administrable groupings
of similar items of income.”).
78. STEINES, supra note 27, at 402.
79. Id. For example, cross crediting could encourage a taxpayer in an excess
credit position to undertake a less profitable foreign transaction instead of a
more profitable one if the former is subject to lower enough foreign taxes such
that the increased benefit from cross crediting would outweigh the foregone
pretax profitability.
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used the transactional approach in the past, and some still do.80
The reason the transactional item-by-item limitation was never
implemented in the United States was that it was viewed as im-
practical to administer.81 But, that does not make it less legiti-
mate or theoretically incorrect. Note that the transactional ap-
proach may even make better sense from a treaty perspective
because, subject to anti-avoidance consistency rules, U.S. trea-
ties can be applied on an item-by-item basis.82 The overall limi-
tation, on the other hand, bundles all items of foreign-source in-
come together and allows averaging,83 but unlike the unlimited
credit, it does not allow an overall excess credit to reduce the
U.S. tax on U.S.-source income.84 Therefore, the overall limita-
tion does not affect the dollar-for-dollar credit feature because it
lies somewhere between the unlimited credit and the transac-
tional credit on the continuum of legitimate dollar-for-dollar
credit methods.
What about the other Code limitations? The Revenue Act of
1932 added a per-country limitation. This limitation requires
the application of the general limitation separately with respect
to each country,85 with the sum of allowable credits from all
countries not to exceed the overall limitation. The per-country
limitation follows the same general principle underlying the
overall limitation—protecting the U.S. tax base on U.S.-source
80. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], TAXATION OF CROSS-
BORDER PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT, MUTUAL FUNDS AND POSSIBLE TAX
DISTORTIONS 36 (1999); United Kingdom-Corporate Taxation-Country Surveys-
International Aspects, IBFD TAX RESEARCH PLATFORM,
https://online.ibfd.org/kbase/#topic=doc&url=/collec-
tions/gtha/html/gtha_uk_s_006.html&WT.z_nav=Navigation&colid=4915
(last visited Sept. 8, 2016); Ireland-Corporate Taxation-Country Surveys-Inter-
national Aspects, IBFD TAX RESEARCH PLATFORM,
https://online.ibfd.org/kbase/#topic=doc&url=/collec-
tions/gtha/html/gtha_ie_s_006.html&WT.z_nav=Navigation&colid=4915 (last
visited Sept. 9, 2016).
81. See supra note 77.
82. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 84-17, 1984-1 C.B. 308; MODEL TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION, supra note 40, arts. 1(2), 7(2); STEINES, supra note 27, at 286–
87.
83. The specifics could become more intricate, but the general idea is clear.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 904(d)(6); U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 23(3).
84. See supra discussion accompanying notes 60–64.
85. The limitation would be applied separately with respect to each country
by including in the numerator of the limitation’s ratio only taxable income from
sources in that country.
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income from erosion by the foreign tax credit—but also prevents
averaging across countries. Therefore, the per-country limita-
tion was generally stricter than the overall limitation except
when the taxpayer had income in one foreign country and in-
curred a loss in another, in which case the opposite was true.86
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 repealed the overall limita-
tion, leaving the per-country limitation the only one in effect.
Public Law 86-780 of 1960 permitted taxpayers to use the reen-
acted overall limitation instead of the default per-country limi-
tation.87 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 repealed the per-country
limitation and since then the overall limitation has been man-
datory. The per-country limitation undoubtedly keeps the credit
within the spectrum of full dollar-for-dollar credits because it
merely restricts foreign tax averaging to transactions within
each country.88 But, because the per-country limitation is based
on the same general principle underlying the overall limita-
tion—namely, protecting the U.S. tax base on U.S.-source in-
come from erosion by the foreign tax credit—neither the rise nor
the fall of the per-country limitation around the time the modern
language of Article 23(2) was first introduced in 197189 alters the
general credit principle.90 Nonetheless, the historic per-country
limitation provides additional support for the notion that the
86. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM.ON INTERNALREVENUETAXATION, 83RDCONG.,
SUMMARY OF THE NEW PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 AS
AGREED TO BY THE CONFEREES 98 (Comm. Print 1955).
87. Before then, the Technical Amendments Act of 1958 allowed taxpayers
to carry their unused foreign taxes (excess credit) up to two years back or five
years forward.
88. For example, Article 23 of the 1981 U.S. Model Treaty provided for a
per-country limitation with respect to non-income taxes that the treaty treated
as creditable income taxes. See U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION (U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 1981); see also Pamela B. Gann, The Concept of an In-
dependent Treaty Foreign Tax Credit, 38 TAX L. REV. 1, 30–41 (1982). The in-
clusion of this provision was discontinued in later model and actual treaties.
89. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
90. The 1976 Act also introduced the overall foreign loss recapture rule,
which reduced the limitation and, therefore, the credit in years following an
overall foreign loss year. I.R.C. § 904(f). The purpose of this recapture rule is
to eliminate a double tax benefit, once in the overall foreign loss year when
such foreign loss reduces U.S. source taxable income and again in a later profit
year if the foreign country has no net operating loss carry-forward provision.
The overall foreign loss recapture rules are also another refinement of the same
principle of protecting the U.S. tax base on U.S.-source income from erosion by
an unlimited foreign tax credit.
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general credit principle may be applied on a stricter basis than
the overall basis for the purpose of restricting cross crediting.91
To limit cross-crediting practices, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
featured the basket limitations by introducing eight separate
limitation categories, or baskets, in addition to a residual gen-
eral limitation category. The basket limitations require the sep-
arate application of the foreign-tax-credit limitation (including
the carryover rules) to each basket by replacing the numerator
of the limitation ratio with the foreign-source taxable income
from that basket. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (ef-
fective in 2003) reduced the number of baskets from nine to five,
and since 2007 only two baskets remain: passive and general
limitation.92 Viewed as subsequent domestic law amendments
with respect to many U.S. treaties or as preexisting limitations
with respect to later treaties, the basket limitations, significant
as they may be, are still just a refinement of the general overall
limitation principle of protecting the U.S. tax base on U.S.-
source income from erosion by the foreign tax credit. By limiting
averaging separately within each basket, the basket limitations
make the foreign tax credit a stricter version of the dollar-for-
dollar credit against the U.S. tax on U.S.-taxable foreign-source
income but still more lenient than the transactional version.
Therefore, the basket limitations do not alter the general credit
principle of Article 23(2).
To sum up, the general principle of allowing a credit in the
meaning of Article 23(2) refers to the principle of a dollar-for-
dollar reduction in the amount of U.S. tax on U.S.-taxable for-
eign-source income by the amount of foreign taxes paid, applied
on an overall basis, item-by-item basis, or any basis in between.
91. See supra discussion accompanying notes 74–82.
92. Consider a U.S. taxpayer that earns $100 of foreign source active busi-
ness income subject to 50 percent foreign tax and $100 of foreign source passive
investment income subject to 10 percent foreign tax. With a 35 percent U.S.
tax rate and no basket limitations, the taxpayer’s tentative U.S. tax liability
would be $70 (35% X $200) and would get a foreign tax credit for all the $60 of
foreign taxes paid ($50 + $10). This high-low foreign tax averaging is not a
problem in itself. The problem is in that, in being mobile, the booking of passive
income can bemanipulated to allow cross-crediting opportunities. Applying the
overall limitation to each basket separately would impose a $35 limitation on
the active basket and a $35 limitation on the passive basket, allowing only $35
out of the $50 of foreign taxes on active income to be credited in the current
year. The 2004 Act also reduced the excess credit carryback period to one year
but increased the carryforward period to ten years.
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Clearly, to give effect to the limitation, the reduction in the
amount of U.S. tax on U.S.-taxable foreign-source income is only
to the extent of such U.S. tax and may not reduce it below zero.93
This view is also consistent with the OECD Model Treaty,94
which describes the credit method as a dollar-for-dollar credit95
and limits the credit to the home-country pre-credit tax on taxa-
ble foreign-source income.96
II. TREATY COMPATIBILITY OF REFORM PROPOSALS
The article turns next to examining the treaty compatibility of
various reform proposals. After establishing that a U.S. move to
an exemption system would be treaty compatible, this Part ex-
plains why the Camp proposal is such a treaty-compatible ex-
emption proposal and why, as an outright fixed combination of
exemption and full credit, Option Z is also treaty compatible.
This Part then demonstrates why any proposal that is or can be
expressed as a fixed or floating combination of exemption and
full credit would be treaty compatible, and shows that the Op-
tion Y, the Grubert and Altshuler, and the Obama administra-
tion proposals are treaty compatible. This Part then turns to dis-
cussing Shaviro’s proposal and explains how it can be imple-
mented in a treaty-compatible manner.
A. Exemption
The determination of how a U.S. move to an exemption system
would fare with Article 23 entails two questions. First, whether
an exemption system is compatible with Article 23(2). Second, if
answered yes, whether a U.S.move to such a system would raise
treaty concerns.
1. Exemption Systems
Under an exemption system, the home country relieves double
taxation by exempting covered foreign-source income of its tax-
payers from the home-country tax. To also allow a credit for for-
eign taxes on such income would be a double relief. Therefore,
93. See supra note 74.
94. See supra last two sentences of note 39.
95. See OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 55, arts. 23A(2) (first sentence),
23B(1) (flush language) (both describing the credit as a deduction of the
amount of foreign tax from the home-country pre-credit tax).
96. Id.
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there should be no allowance of a credit for foreign taxes on for-
eign-source income that is exempt from home-country taxation
by reason of its exemption system.97 Although Article 23 is titled
“Relief from Double Taxation” and the Model Technical Expla-
nation of Article 23 states that Article 23 “describes the manner
in which each Contracting State undertakes to relieve double
taxation,” the U.S. obligation under Article 23(2) to allow a
credit does not include language similar to the “double-taxation-
will-be-relieved-through” language of Article 23(1) regarding the
treaty partner’s obligation. 98 Therefore, the theoretically correct
conclusion that a U.S. move to an exemption system would obvi-
ate the U.S. obligation to allow a credit with respect to income
that is no longer subject to double taxation does not immediately
follow technically and requires some more substantiation.
97. Foreign-source income could be exempt from the home-country tax not
by reason of an exemption system, for example, due to base differences between
the home and source countries. The extent to which, if at all, a worldwide sys-
tem would allow a credit for foreign taxes on such income could be a matter of
cross crediting or averaging.
98. The “double-taxation-will-be-relieved-through” language of Article 23(1)
is not necessarily understood to mean that the treaty partner is obligated to
apply the treaty relief method only when actual U.S. taxation is imposed on
U.S.-source income of a resident of the treaty partner. For example, the equiv-
alent provision (Article 25(2)) in the income tax treaty between the United
States and Luxembourg provides that “[i]n Luxembourg double taxation shall
be eliminated as follows: a) where a resident of Luxembourg derives income or
owns capital which, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may
be taxed in the United States, Luxembourg shall . . . exempt such income or
capital from tax . . . .” Convention Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Lux.-U.S., art. 25(2), Apr. 3, 1996,
2148 U.N.T.S. 81. This provision has been understood by some to mean that
Luxembourg should exempt U.S.-source income that the treaty would allow
the United States to tax, regardless of whether the United States actually
taxes such income. See, e.g., Bilateral Tax Treaty Negotiations Between the
United States and Luxembourg, TREASURY.GOV (June 22, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Lux-
embourg-Statement-06222016.pdf. This interpretation focuses on the lan-
guage “in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed in
the United States,” and seems to view the language “[i]n Luxembourg double
taxation shall be eliminated” as requiring the elimination of the potential for
double taxation and therefore tolerating non-taxation.
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An exemption system combines exemption and credit because
what it typically means is that only foreign-source business in-
come (mainly in the form of dividends received by a U.S. parent
from controlled foreign corporations) is exempt from U.S. taxa-
tion, but other foreign-source income (mainly investment in-
come) remains taxable by the home country on a worldwide basis
with an allowance for a foreign tax credit.99 Therefore, qualifying
an exemption system under Article 23(2) would not render any
part of the article a surplusage. To be sure, also the language of
Article 23(2)(b) would remain necessary because the exemption
would apply only to dividends out of business income, such that
99. For example, Article 23A of the OECD Model Treaty describes the ex-
emption method for relief from double taxation as a combination of exemption
(paragraph 1) and credit (paragraph 2) as follows:
1. Where a resident of a Contracting State derives income or
owns capital which, in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention, may be taxed in the other Contracting State, the
first-mentioned State shall, subject to the provisions of para-
graphs 2 and 3, exempt such income or capital from tax.
2. Where a resident of a Contracting State derives items of
income which, in accordance with the provisions of Articles
10 and 11, may be taxed in the other Contracting State, the
first-mentioned State shall allow as a deduction from the tax
on the income of that resident an amount equal to the tax
paid in that other State. Such deduction shall not, however,
exceed that part of the tax, as computed before the deduction
is given, which is attributable to such items of income derived
from that other State.
3. Where in accordance with any provision of the Convention
income derived or capital owned by a resident of a Contract-
ing State is exempt from tax in that State, such State may
nevertheless, in calculating the amount of tax on the remain-
ing income or capital of such resident, take into account the
exempted income or capital.
4. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to income
derived or capital owned by a resident of a Contracting State
where the other Contracting State applies the provisions of
this Convention to exempt such income or capital from tax or
applies the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 10 or 11 to
such income.
OECDMODEL TREATY, supra note 55, art. 23A.
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dividends out of investment (or passive) income would remain
both taxable in the United States and eligible for the indirect
foreign tax credit.
Under an exemption system, foreign-source business income
would be exempt from U.S. taxation and therefore excluded from
the limitation formula. All that is needed to effectively disallow
any credit for foreign taxes on such exempt income is to intro-
duce a new limitation basket for U.S.-exempt foreign-source in-
come. As a result of the application of the overall limitation to
each basket separately,100 the U.S.-taxable-foreign-source-in-
come multiplier of the exemption basket limitation would be
zero, resulting in a zero limitation in the basket at all times.101
Therefore, this exemption basket would both prevent the credit-
ing of foreign taxes on U.S.-exempt foreign-source income and
ensure that all such foreign taxes are carried over as excess
credit within the separate exemption basket until their expira-
tion.102 The exemption basket limitation basically restricts cross
crediting by requiring a tax-base correlation between the cred-
itable foreign taxes and the U.S. taxes against which the credit
is taken. Not being stricter than a transactional (item-by-item)
limitation on the spectrum of allowable methods of dollar-for-
dollar credit, the exemption basket limitation is a legitimate lim-
itation that does not change the general principle of allowing a
credit.103 That is, Article 23(2)’s general credit principle—
namely, the allowance of a dollar-for-dollar reduction (but not
below zero) in the amount of U.S.-tax on U.S.-taxable foreign-
source income by the amount of foreign taxes—remains in place,
and therefore an exemption system with the exemption basket
mechanism is compatible with Article 23(2). This view is also
100. I.R.C. § 904(d)(1).
101. Recall that the overall limitation formula is the taxpayer’s tentative
(pre-credit) U.S. tax liability for the year multiplied by the ratio of the tax-
payer’s taxable foreign-source income to the taxpayer’s entire (worldwide) tax-
able income for that year. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. When the
limitation is applied separately to the exemption basket, the formula result
will always be zero because there is zero taxable foreign-source income in the
exemption basket.
102. Recall the zero limitation in the basket at all times.
103. See supra notes 72–96 and accompanying text. Applying the foreign tax
credit general limitation on a transactional (item-by-item) basis would result
in the disallowance of credit for foreign taxes on U.S.-exempt foreign-source
income because of the required full tax-base correlation between the creditable
foreign taxes and the U.S. tax against which the credit is taken.
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consistent with the OECD Model language of OECD Article 23A
(describing the exemption method)104 and OECD Article 23B (de-
scribing the credit method),105 both of which envision and allow
combinations of exemption and credit,106 which is what an ex-
emption system is all about.107
Thus, if we must worry about formalism in applying treaty
provisions, any exemption system could be easily structured and
drafted in a manner that the disallowance of credit for foreign
taxes on U.S.-exempt foreign-source income is reached through
an exemption basket mechanism (which is but a treaty-compat-
ible limitation on cross crediting). Such strict formalism, how-
ever, is not warranted in applying Article 23(2). Recall that Ar-
ticle 23(2) allows post-treaty statutory amendments of foreign
tax credit limitations so long as such amendments do not change
the general principle of allowing a credit. A basic rule of con-
struction in the treaty-compatibility context is that when a
treaty and a statute relate to the same subject, they must be
construed “so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without
violating the language of either.”108 Far from violating the lan-
guage of Article 23(2), a substance-over-form harmonizing inter-
pretation of Article 23(2) is consistent with, and even mandated
by, the undefined term “credit” and Article 23(2)’s reference to
its own “general principle.” This view holds even under the most
literal or formalistic approach in interpreting treaties. First, as
discussed above, Article 3(2) of the U.S. Model Treaty, which is
included in all U.S. tax treaties, provides that, unless the context
requires otherwise, the term “credit,” as an undefined treaty
term, shall have the meaning it has under U.S. tax law.109 Be-
cause the substance-over-form approach is fundamental to all
104. See supra note 99.
105. See OECDMODEL TREATY, supra note 55.
106. See id. arts. 23A(2), 23B(1) (flush language), 23B(2). Note that the U.S.
Model Technical Explanation follows the same approach by stating that Article
23(1) of the U.S. Model Treaty “provides that the other Contracting State will
provide relief from double taxation through [the credit method/the exemption
method/a mixture of the credit and exemption methods].”
107. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
108. Kappus v. Comm’r, 337 F.3d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Whitney
v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
109. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
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aspects of U.S. tax law,110 it applies also to the meaning given to
the term “credit.”Note here that the context of Article 23(2) does
not require otherwise because the substance-over-form approach
has always been a “black-letter principle” of U.S. tax law.111 Sec-
ond, Article 23(2) refers to its own “general principle.” The term
“general principle,” either generally or as an undefined treaty
term taking a U.S.-internal-law meaning, indicates a substance-
over-form approach as well.112 Third, the rationale behind the
argument that treaties should be interpreted restrictively is that
a country should be presumed to have waived its sovereignty
only when the text of the treaty provision leaves no doubt as to
such intention.113 This rationale, however, does not apply here
because the nonrestrictive substance-over-form interpretation of
Article 23(2) in this context is meant to preserve U.S. sover-
eignty.
Because the bottom-line effect of the exemption basket limita-
tion is to disallow credit for foreign taxes on U.S.-exempt foreign-
source income,114 and because the treaty-compatibility determi-
nation turns on the substance, not form, of the credit limitation,
substituting the exemption basket mechanism with an effec-
tively equivalent outright statutory disallowance of credit for
110. See, e.g., PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 S.Ct. 1897, 1905 (2013) (citing
Comm’r v. Sw. Expl. Co., 350 U. S. 308, 315 (1956) (“[T]ax law deals in economic
realities, not legal abstractions.”)).
111. Id. Recall that the unless-the-context-requires-otherwise qualifier of Ar-
ticle 3(2) of the U.S. Model Treaty is meant to address the concern that “[t]he
use of ‘ambulatory’ definitions . . . may lead to results that are at variance with
the intentions of the negotiators and of the Contracting States when the treaty
was negotiated and ratified.” MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 40,
art. 3(2); see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
112. Article 19 of the Protocol to the U.S.-Germany Treaty, supra note 44,
includes an unusual provision that defines the term “general principle hereof”
of Article 23(1) of that treaty, which is the equivalent of Article 23(2) of the
U.S. Model Treaty. The provision provides that “the ‘general principle hereof’
means the avoidance of double taxation by allowing a credit . . . . While the
details and limitations of the credit pursuant to this paragraph may change as
provisions of United States law change, any such changes must preserve a
credit for German taxes . . . . This definition does not change the analysis above.
Apart from the provision’s unusual nature (as it does not seem to appear in
other treaties), the definition still implies a reference to a principle. But, more
importantly, the definition uses the undefined term “credit,” which in any
event brings back the substance-over-form approach. See supra notes 109–111.
113. See Vogel, supra note 49, at 32.
114. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
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foreign taxes on U.S.-exempt foreign-source income—say, for
simplification purposes—should not raise treaty compatibility
concerns. In such a context, such an outright disallowance of
credit is but a different form of what in substance is the same
domestic law limitation—namely, the exemption basket limita-
tion—that does not change the “general principle” of allowing a
credit. Note that without first establishing that the effectively
equivalent exemption basket limitation is treaty compatible, the
mere fact that the effect of a limitation is to disallow a credit for
foreign taxes on U.S.-exempt foreign-source income would argu-
ably not be sufficient grounds for the conclusion that such a lim-
itation qualifies under Article 23(2). The reason is that the gen-
eral principle of Article 23(2) is not the allowance of a dollar-for-
dollar credit for foreign taxes on U.S.-taxable foreign-source in-
come but the allowance of a dollar-for-dollar credit for foreign
taxes against the U.S. tax on U.S.-taxable foreign-source in-
come.115
2. A Move to an Exemption System
The conclusion that an exemption system is treaty compatible
does not necessarily mean that a move to an exemption system
would be treaty compatible as well. The negotiations and signing
of a tax treaty take into account the tax systems and rate struc-
tures in effect in both countries, such that future system or rate
changes in either country could distort the balance on which the
treaty allocation of taxing rights was based. This “reliance” con-
cept is central to the proposed changes to the Introduction of the
OECD Model Treaty regarding the identification of tax policy
considerations that are relevant to the decision to enter into,
amend, or terminate a treaty,116 and to Treasury’s correspond-
ing, (then-) proposed additions of the “special tax regimes”
(“STR”) provisions and a “subsequent changes in law” article
115. See supra Part I.B.
116. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], PREVENTING THE
GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6:
2014 DELIVERABLE 103 (2014); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD],
PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE
CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6 - 2015 FINAL REPORT 94–95 (2015) [hereinafter
ACTION 6 FINAL REPORT].
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(new Article 28) to the U.S. Model Treaty.117 These proposals
were followed both by the OECD’s proposed changes to the
OECDModel Treaty, which included new provisions on STR and
a new general rule intended to make a tax treaty responsive to
certain future changes in a country’s domestic tax laws,118 and
most recently by Treasury’s introduction of the new STR provi-
sions and Article 28 into the (2016) U.S. Model Treaty.119 In a
sense, Articles 1(7) and 1(8) of the (2016) U.S. Model Treaty
could also be added to the list.120
At best, however, it is still highly doubtful that this reliance
concept had anything to do with Article 23. First, Article 23 is
articulated merely as a “relief from double taxation” article and
there is no indication to any other effect in the article’s language
or Model Technical Explanation, despite the fact that since Jan-
uary 2003, the OECD commentary on OECD Article 23 has in-
cluded language on optional revisions to OECD Article 23B(2)
reflecting the reliance issue.121 Second, short of termination,
which is too drastic an action to be seriously considered and
which in any event can be unilaterally exercised without cause,
117. SELECTDRAFT PROVISIONS OF THEU.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION,
SPECIAL TAX REGIMES (U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 2015), https://www.treas-
ury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Special-Tax-Re-
gimes-5-20-2015.pdf; SELECTDRAFTPROVISIONSOFTHEU.S.MODEL INCOMETAX
CONVENTION, SUBSEQUENTCHANGES INLAW (U.S. DEP’T OF THETREASURY 2015)
[hereinafter DRAFT PROVISIONS: ARTICLE 28], https://www.treasury.gov/re-
source-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Subsequent-Changes-in-
Law-5-20-2015.pdf.
118. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], REVISED DISCUSSION
DRAFT, BEPS ACTION 6: PREVENT TREATY ABUSE 16–19 (2015) [hereinafter
REVISED DISCUSSION DRAFT], http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/revised-discus-
sion-draft-beps-action-6-prevent-treaty-abuse.pdf; ACTION 6 FINAL REPORT, su-
pra note 116, at 96–98.
119. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, arts. 3(l), 11(2)(c), 12(2)(a),
21(2)(a), 28; 2016 PREAMBLE, supra note 40.
120. Generally, Article 1(7) requires matching the source-country treaty re-
lief with the residence-country inclusion, while Article 1(8) is the updated “tri-
angular permanent establishment” provision. Those provisions would deny, or
allow the source country to deny, treaty benefits with respect to income that
enjoys low or no taxation by the residence country or on a combined basis, and
can also apply to post-treaty changes in a treaty partner’s domestic laws re-
sulting in such effects. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 1(7), (8).
121. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], COMMENTARIES ON THE
ARTICLES OF THEMODEL TAX CONVENTION para 31.1 (2010); Org. for Econ. Co-
operation & Dev. [OECD], 2002 Reports Related to the OECD Model Tax Con-
vention, ISSUES IN INT’L TAXATION, no. 8, May 16, 2003, at 25–26.
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there is nothing a treaty partner can unilaterally do under the
treaty about the other country’s violation of Article 23.122 Indeed,
an affected taxpayer can claim treaty benefits under Article 23
from the violating home country, possibly leading to a mutual
agreement procedure involving the two countries;123 but, if any-
thing,124 that could be a remedy for the affected taxpayer not the
other country whose purported reliance interest clearly would
not be aligned with the taxpayer’s interests, especially in the
context of a U.S. move to an exemption system.125 New Article
28 of the 2016 U.S. Model Treaty, on the other hand, would allow
the source country to retain its full taxing rights and deny treaty
benefits with respect to dividend, interest, royalty, or other in-
come in certain cases of post-treaty reductions in, or exemptions
from, the residence-country company tax if consultations “with
a view to amending the [treaty to] restore an appropriate alloca-
tion of taxing rights” do not progress.126 The proposed STR pro-
visions follow the same general idea if the residence country ef-
fectively employs post-treaty special tax regimes that reduce its
tax with respect to certain deductible related-party payments.127
Third, and perhaps most importantly, even those new provisions
do not apply to a move to an exemption system that exempts only
foreign-source dividends or business profits from permanent es-
tablishments, which is the exemption system examined here.128
122. A mutual agreement procedure without a mandatory arbitration mech-
anism would not be effective in this context because it would require a bilateral
agreement, and if the specific treaty provides for mandatory arbitration in its
mutual agreement procedure article, such arbitration can be triggered only if
a case is initiated by the taxpayer or is presented to either competent authority
on a taxpayer-specific basis. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 25(6).
123. Id. art. 25.
124. See supra note 122.
125. If the United States moves to an exemption system, the treaty partner’s
reliance interest would be to reinstate a worldwide system with or without a
foreign tax credit, which is contrary to the taxpayer’s interest.
126. DRAFT PROVISIONS: ARTICLE 28, supra note 117; see also 2016 PREAMBLE,
supra note 40.
127. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, arts. 3(1)(l), 11(2)(c), 12(2)(a),
21(2)(a); see also 2016 PREAMBLE, supra note 40. The OECD’s proposed addi-
tions follow the same idea. See REVISEDDISCUSSIONDRAFT, supra note 118, at
16–19; ACTION 6 FINALREPORT, supra note 116, at 96–98.
128. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, arts. 3(1)(l), 28; see also 2016
PREAMBLE, supra note 40; cf. DRAFTPROVISIONS: ARTICLE 28, supra note 117, at
3, 4 (“The reference [to an exemption for substantially all foreign source in-
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A move to such an exemption system would not raise any reli-
ance interest concerns because, in any event, all treaties pre-
serve the source-countries’ right to fully tax business profits of
permanent establishments.129
If it was not for the reliance issue, one can wonder, however,
why else would the United States commit itself to the specifics
of the current language of Article 23 instead of having Article 23
simply say: “Double taxation will be relieved through the credit
method, the exemption method or a combination of the two.”130
Arguably, such language would be clear enough to convey the
desired idea and at the same time would allow for future reform
flexibility along the spectrum of acceptable methods. One possi-
ble explanation for why the United States prefers the more spe-
cific language of Article 23 is the concern that the general lan-
guage would open the door for taxpayers to challenge the U.S.
statutory relief from double taxation as inadequate in princi-
ple. Another possible explanation is that the United States pre-
fers not to give U.S. taxpayers any ideas about or hopes for pos-
sible changes to the U.S. tax system in order to minimize unde-
sirable behavioral responses to such expectations.131 In any
event, as discussed below, the specific language of Article 23 al-
lows for at least the same flexibility that the suggested general
language would offer.
3. The Camp Proposal
If a U.S. move to an exemption system is treaty compatible,
would the enactment of the Camp proposal also be treaty com-
patible? As mentioned above,132 the Camp proposal would ex-
come] does not include taxation systems under which only foreign source divi-
dends or business profits from foreign permanent establishments are exempt
from tax by a Contracting State.”).
129. But see Shay, supra note 10, at 113 (viewing treaty negotiations on a
unitary, not item-by-item, basis) (“The source country reduces its withholding
taxes on dividends, interests, and royalties and does not tax business income
unless the treaty partner resident has a permanent establishment, in exchange
for the residence country agreeing to either credit the source country taxes or
exempt income the source country is permitted to tax under the treaty.”).
130. Cf.MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 40, art. 23(1).
131. One example is how expectations for future reductions in the repatria-
tion tax rate contribute to the foreign earnings lockout problem. See, e.g., Fadi
Shaheen, Understanding Lockout, 69 TAX L. REV. 231, 253–61 (2016).
132. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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empt from U.S. taxation 95 percent of repatriated immobile for-
eign-source business income and disallow any foreign tax credit
or deduction with respect to all such income. The treaty concern
about this proposal is that it leaves 5 percent of the repatriated
immobile foreign-source income taxable without the allowance
of a credit.
This full taxation of 5 percent of the covered income, however,
is a substitute for the disallowance of deductions for expenses
incurred in generating exempt income.133 Viewed this way, this
proxy taxation should not be problematic, especially since the
disallowance of such deductions would serve the same general
purpose of the overall limitation—namely, protecting the U.S.
tax base on domestic source income.134 Furthermore, a direct dis-
allowance of such actual allocable deductions would be unques-
tionably justified because then there would be no proxy taxation,
100 percent of the covered income would be fully exempt and the
allocable expenses would be clearly attributable to fully exempt
income. Therefore, what the proposal’s proxy taxation is really
about is not a tax on the 5 percent proxy base amount as taxable
income, but a haircut equal to the proxy base amount on allow-
able deductions. That is, in essence, the covered income is fully
exempt, but taxable income (e.g., U.S.-source taxable income) is
increased by the proxy base amount as a result of the reduction
by the same amount in the amount of allowable deductions.
Thus, again, if one must worry about formalism in applying
treaty provisions, the Camp proposal could be easily redrafted to
reflect its substance by setting the participation exemption at
100 percent (instead of 95 percent) and adding a haircut on al-
lowable deductions equal to 5 percent of the covered income.
Reaching the exact same result, the proposal then would be a
straightforward exemption system and therefore treaty compat-
ible.
But, again, such strict formalism is not warranted. We have
already established that a move to an exemption system would
be treaty compatible because it would not change the “general
133. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ONTAXATION, 83RDCONG., JCX-15-14, TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, A DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS TO REFORM THE
INTERNALREVENUECODE: TITLE IV - PARTICIPATIONEXEMPTIONSYSTEM FOR THE
TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME 24 (Comm. Print 2014).
134. SHAVIRO, supra note 9, at 188. But cf. Shay, supra note 10, at 113.
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principle” of Article 23(2).135 We have also demonstrated that
perhaps not in form but definitely in substance, the original 95-
percent Camp proposal is an exemption system.136 Therefore, be-
cause the treaty compatibility question here is a question of sub-
stance, not form,137 the Camp proposal is treaty compatible also
in its original form.
B. Intracategory Combinations of Exemption and Credit
Under a standard exemption system, foreign-source business
income is fully exempt and foreign-source investment income is
fully taxed with an allowance for a foreign tax credit. This sys-
tem combines exemption and credit across source categories of
income. But, what about an intracategory combination like Op-
tion Z, which keeps foreign-source investment income fully tax-
able with the allowance of a credit, but combines exemption and
credit for foreign-source business income? Recall that under Op-
tion Z, 60 percent of the covered foreign-source business income
is taxable at the full U.S. rate and the remaining 40 percent of
the covered foreign-source business income is exempt, and the
allowed credit is only for 60 percent of the applicable foreign
taxes.
A move to such a system would be treaty compatible for the
exact same reasons discussed above with respect to an exemp-
tion system. By definition, the exempt portion of business in-
come would be excluded from the foreign-tax-credit limitation
formula; and ideally, the limitation would be applied separately
to an investment-income basket, a taxable-business-income bas-
ket, and an exempt-income basket.138 As discussed above, sub-
stituting the exemption basket limitation with an outright dis-
allowance of credit for foreign taxes on U.S.-exempt foreign-
source income remains treaty compatible.139 Option Z follows
this outright-disallowance structure. It does so by adding to the
two existing passive and general limitation baskets140 a new lim-
itation basket for the 60 percent taxable portion of the covered
business income coupled with an outright disallowance of credit
for foreign taxes on the 40 percent exempt portion of the covered
135. See supra Part II.A.1, 2.
136. See supra discussion accompanying notes 133–134.
137. See supra discussion accompanying notes 108–115.
138. See supra discussion accompanying notes 100–107.
139. See supra discussion accompanying notes 108–115.
140. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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business income.141 Again, if formalism so requires, Option Z
could be easily redrafted to create a fourth basket for the 40 per-
cent exempt portion of the covered business income instead of
the outright disallowance of credit for foreign taxes on such in-
come.
Option Z, therefore, is basically identical to an exemption sys-
tem in all aspects but one. Both systems combine exemption and
credit, and both systems disallow credit for foreign taxes on the
exempt covered income, either by an exemption basket limita-
tion mechanism or by an outright disallowance. The only differ-
ence between the two systems is that, while an exemption sys-
tem combines exemption and credit across source categories of
income, Option Z does so within a category of income. This dif-
ference, however, is inconsequential. In fact, since 1988, the
Code has included an actual example of an intracategory combi-
nation of exemption and credit, and no treaty compatibility con-
cerns have been raised about it. That is the special foreign tax
credit limitation rule for capital gains.142 Long-term capital
gains of individual taxpayers are accorded a preferential tax
rate.143 By generally excluding the rate differential portion of
capital gains from foreign-source taxable income in the (short-
hand) foreign tax credit limitation formula,144 the special rule
effectively treats the preferential rate as a combination of ex-
emption and credit.145 If, for example, the capital gain preferen-
tial tax rate is 20 percent and the full tax rate is 40 percent, the
rate differential portion would be 20% / 40% = 50%. If the tax-
payer has $100 of foreign-source capital gain and no other for-
eign-source income, the taxpayer’s foreign tax credit limitation,
in the shorthand form, would be 40% X [$100 – (50% X $100)] =
$20. Because taxing all capital gain at 50 percent of the full rate
is exactly the same as taxing 50 percent of all capital gain at the
full rate and exempting the remaining 50 percent from taxation,
141. See JCX-15-13, supra note 12, at 51.
142. I.R.C. § 904(b)(2)(B).
143. See I.R.C. § 1(h).
144. In fact, the rule excludes the rate differential portion of foreign-source
capital gain from the numerator and the rate differential portion of all capital
gain from the denominator of the full foreign tax credit limitation formula. See
I.R.C. § 904(b)(2)(B).
145. The special rule also applies to qualified dividend income that enjoys the
same preferential rate. See id.
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the effect of the special rule is to exclude the exempt portion of
capital gain from the limitation formula.146
Hence, Option Z is treaty compatible. Option Z is a fixed com-
bination of exemption and credit because the exempt (or credit)
portion is a fixed percentage, here 40 percent (or 60 percent
credit). There is obviously no magic to using 40 percent, and any
other fixed percentage between 0 and 100 percent inclusive
would do. But, what about a floating percentage?147 Because any
fixed percentage would work and any floating percentage is fixed
in hindsight, there is no reason why a floating percentage would
not work as well. Once applied, the floating percentage becomes
fixed, thereby determining the exempt and taxable portions, and
we are back on familiar territory.148 Again, the determinative
feature here is the effective allowance in all cases of a dollar-for-
dollar reduction (but not below zero) in the amount of U.S. tax
146. Indeed, a taxpayer may be in an excess limitation position enough to
allow the taxpayer to credit all foreign taxes in the basket regardless of the
reduction in the limitation amount, rendering the exclusion of the exempt por-
tion of capital gain from the limitation formula of no current-year significance.
But, the taxpayer may also have no excess limitation whatsoever, in which case
the exclusion of the exempt portion of capital gain from the limitation formula
would be fully effective. Because for a provision to be treaty compatible it has
to comply with the treaty in all possible scenarios, the special foreign tax credit
limitation rule for capital gain remains a good example of an intracategory
combination of exemption and credit. Note that the one-year repatriation tax
holiday of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422,
118 Stat. 1418, 1514–19 (2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 965), which
effectively exempted 85 percent of covered foreign source dividends and al-
lowed a scaled down foreign tax credit for the taxable portion, is a clear exam-
ple of an intracategory combination of exemption and credit. This provision,
however, is of no significance for our purposes because of its elective nature,
which makes it treaty compatible regardless of it being a perfect combination
of exemption and credit. Because multinationals could still benefit from the
normal foreign tax credit regime by choosing not to benefit from the holiday,
the United States was still in full compliance with the treaty obligations to
allow a credit. See also infra discussion accompanying notes 176–177.
147. A simple example of an outright floating combination of exemption and
credit would be a variation on Option Z where the exemption portion would be
a floating percentage, say x (0 > 1 > 1-, which depends on the effective foreign
tax rate, and the credit portion would be 1 – x. The dependence of x on the
effective foreign tax rate could be determined by any reasonable formula. For
example, x could equal 150 percent of the applicable effective tax rate.
148. In the example of footnote 147, if the applicable effective foreign tax rate
on an item of foreign source income is 20 percent, the exemption portion (x)
with respect to that item would be 30 percent, and the credit portion (1 – x)
would be 70 percent.
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on U.S.-taxable foreign-source income by the amount of foreign
taxes paid, subject to any limitation on cross crediting that is not
stricter than a transactional (item-by-item) limitation.
C. Variations on Intracategory Combinations of Exemption and
Credit
Building on Warren’s credit and deduction interchangeability
analysis,149 the following discussion examines the treaty compat-
ibility of the remaining reform proposals and lays out a uniform
method for identifying proposals that are or can be expressed as
outright fixed or floating combinations of exemption and full
credit. Warren’s analysis focuses on the interchangeability of a
credit and a deduction, and allows for less than a dollar-for-dol-
lar credit (partial creditability). Following a similar methodol-
ogy, the analysis here focuses on the interchangeability between
outright combinations of exemption and full credit on the one
hand, and other structures on the other hand but without allow-
ing for partial credit. The importance of exemption and full
credit combinations for treaty purposes is that such combina-
tions preserve the general principle of Article 23(2) of allowing a
dollar-for-dollar reduction (but not below zero) in the amount of
U.S. tax on U.S.-taxable foreign-source income by the amount of
foreign taxes paid, which is the key for treaty compatibility. Con-
sequently, the general argument is that any system that is or
can be expressed as an outright fixed or floating combination of
exemption and full credit is treaty compatible regardless of how
it is actually labeled or expressed. That is so because, as dis-
cussed above,150 even under the most literal and formalistic ap-
plication of treaties, such a system does not change the general
principle of Article 23(2) when applied on an overall basis, trans-
actional basis, or any basis in between. That is, any system that
is, or can be expressed as, an outright fixed or floating combina-
tion of exemption and full credit reduces (dollar of dollar, but not
below zero) the U.S. tax that would otherwise be imposed on for-
eign-source income by the amount of foreign taxes paid, and
therefore is treaty compatible. Again, such a harmonizing inter-
pretation is mandated when no treaty or statutory language is
149. Warren, Jr., supra note 10.
150. See supra discussion accompanying notes 108–115.
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violated,151 especially where, like here, the treaty language (Ar-
ticle 23(2)) allows, or even mandates, a substance-over-form ap-
proach.152 Rejecting the government’s literal approach for deter-
mining whether a foreign tax is creditable and restating that
U.S. “tax law deals in economic realities, not legal abstrac-
tions,”153 the Supreme Court in PPL Corp. v. Commissioner
treated a onetime backward-looking U.K. windfall tax as a cred-
itable income tax for U.S. tax purposes because, for nearly all
the companies subject to the tax, the windfall tax was the alge-
braic equivalent of a creditable income tax.154 The same logic ap-
plies here, because in the same way that the Supreme Court
found that “algebraic reformulations illustrate the economic
substance of [a] tax,”155 algebraic reformulations also illustrate
the economic substance of a tax system.
In any event, here too, if one were still to worry about strict
formalism in interpreting and applying Article 23(2), any pro-
posal that can be expressed as a perfect fixed or floating combi-
nation of exemption and full credit could simply be redrafted as
such, utilizing the uniform method used below for identifying
such proposals.
1. Global Minimum Tax—Option Y
Option Y would exempt foreign-source business income from
U.S. taxation if the income is subject to an effective foreign tax
rate of 80 percent or more of the U.S. rate, but otherwise would
tax such income at 80 percent of the U.S. tax rate and allow a
full foreign tax credit. It is hard to imagine a reasonable treaty-
compatibility concern about this proposal because, depending on
the applicable effective foreign tax rate, it would either exempt
foreign-source business income or tax it at the threshold rate
with the allowance of full foreign tax credit. Still, this proposal
is helpful for introducing the uniform method developed here for
identifying proposals that are or can be expressed as outright
fixed or floating combinations of exemption and full credit, and
thus treaty compatible.
151. See supra text accompanying note 108.
152. See supra discussion accompanying notes 108–115.
153. PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 S. Ct. 1897, 1905 (2013) (citing Comm’r v. Sw.
Expl. Co., 350 U. S. 308, 315 (1956)).
154. Id. at 1897.
155. Id. at 1905.
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Option Y is, or can be expressed as, a floating combination of
exemption and credit. If the effective foreign tax rate is not less
than 80 percent of the U.S. rate, the exemption portion with re-
spect to business income is 100 percent. When the effective for-
eign tax rate drops below 80 percent of the U.S. rate, the exemp-
tion portion drops below 100 percent in a defined direct relation-
ship to the effective foreign tax rate. If the full U.S. tax rate is 1
and the effective foreign tax rate is 1∗, where 1 * 1 and . 81 * 1∗ &0, the U.S. tax under Option Y on $1 of before-foreign-tax for-
eign-source business income would be . 81 % 1∗. The U.S. tax on
the same $1 under an outright floating combination of exemp-
tion and credit would be 431 % 1∗2, where 4 is the credit portion
and therefore a value between 0 and 100 percent inclusive (that
is, 0 ( 4 ( 1). Equivalence between the two tax results is
reached when 4 - .).'.∗.'.∗ .156 Because . 81 * 1∗ & 0, the numeratorof the right hand side of the condition is smaller than the denom-
inator and both are greater than zero at all times. Therefore,
equivalence can always be reached for any 4 between zero and
one (0 , 4 , 1), which is within the permissible range for 4 as
the credit portion (0 ( 4 ( 1). The exemption portion 1 % 4
would therefore be ./..'.∗,157 which clearly bears a defined directrelationship to 1∗ and, like the credit portion, is also determina-
ble at all times. Therefore, Option Y is a perfect floating combi-
nation of exemption and credit and as such is treaty compatible.
2. Minimum Tax Variations—the Altshuler and Grubert
Proposal
Altshuler and Grubert would impose a 15 percent per-country
minimum tax on foreign-source active income with expensing for
real investment in the country and a credit for the effective for-
eign tax rate up to the 15 percent threshold. They also consider
varying the proposal by disallowing the expensing and/or by cal-
culating the minimum tax on an overall, instead of country-by-
country, basis.158 Altshuler and Grubert also envision a reduc-
tion in the general corporate tax rate (1) from 35 percent to 30
percent. All variations of this proposal use the same 15 percent
156. . 81 % 1∗ - 431 % 1∗2 ⇔ 4 - .).'.∗.'.∗ .157. 1 % 4 - 1 % .).'.∗.'.∗ - ./..'.∗.158. Grubert & Altshuler, supra note 14.
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reduced rate creditability method for “eliminating double taxa-
tion,” and therefore can all be modeled identically for treaty pur-
poses.
This proposal is a perfect floating combination of exemption
and credit. If the effective foreign tax rate is not less than 15
percent, the exemption portion is 100 percent. When the effec-
tive foreign tax rate drops below 15 percent, the exemption por-
tion drops below 100 percent in a defined direct relationship to
the effective foreign tax rate. When . 15 ) 1∗ & 0, the U.S. tax
under the proposal on a taxable $1 of before-foreign-tax foreign-
source active income would be . 15 % 1∗. The U.S. tax on the same
$1 under an outright floating combination of exemption and
credit would be 431 % 1∗2. Equivalence between the two tax re-
sults is reached when 4 - .0,'.∗.'.∗ .159 Because 1 ) .15 ) 1∗ & 0, thedenominator is greater than the numerator, and both are
greater than zero, which means that 0 + 4 ( 1. Therefore, there
will always be a permissible credit portion (0 ( 4 ( 1) to satisfy
the floating combination of exemption and full credit. Because
the floating credit portion (4) bears a defined inverse relation-
ship to 1∗, the floating exemption portion, 1 % 4 - .'.0,.'.∗ , bears adefined direct relationship to 1∗ and both are determinable at all
times. As a result, the Altshuler and Grubert proposal is a per-
fect combination of exemption and full credit, and therefore is
treaty compatible.
3. Reduced Rate with Partial Credit—the Obama Admin-
istration Proposal
The Obama administration’s proposal would impose a per-
country residual minimum tax on covered foreign source busi-
ness earnings at a rate of 19% reduced (but not below zero) by
85% of the effective foreign tax rate.160 The proposal, therefore,
taxes foreign-source business income at a reduced rate (19%),
which is about 54% of the general 35% full corporate tax rate (1),
and allows a limited credit for 85% of the foreign taxes paid on
that income.
This proposal is a floating combination of exemption and
credit. If the effective foreign tax rate is not less than .19/.85
(about 22.35 percent), the exemption portion is 100 percent.
159. . 15 % 1∗ - 431 % 1∗2 ⇔ 4 - .0,'.∗.'.∗ .160. GENERAL EXPLANATION 2016, supra note 13; GENERAL EXPLANATION
2017, supra note 13.
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When the effective foreign tax rate drops below .19/.85, the ex-
emption portion drops below 100 percent in a defined direct re-
lationship to the effective foreign tax rate. When .4*.,0 - 5∗ ( 0, theU.S. tax under the proposal on $1 of before-foreign-tax foreign-
source business income would be . 19 ' .855∗. The U.S. tax on the
same $1 under an outright floating combination of exemption
and credit would be 985 ' 5∗7. Equivalence between the two tax
results is reached when 9 1 .4*).,02∗2)2∗ .161 Because 5∗ / .4*.,0 / 5 bydefinition, the denominator (5 ' 5∗) is always greater than the
numerator (. 19 ' .855∗) and both are greater than zero. That is,0 / 9 + 1 and there will always be a permissible credit portion
(0 + 9 + 1) to satisfy the floating combination of exemption and
credit. Because the floating credit portion bears a defined in-
verse relationship to 5∗, the floating exemption portion, 1 ' 9 12).4*).402∗2)2∗ , bears a defined direct relationship to 5∗ and both aredeterminable at all times. Therefore, the Obama administra-
tion’s proposal is a perfect combination of exemption and full
credit and, as such, is treaty compatible.
4. Reduced Rate Deductibility and Shaviro’s Proposal
Shaviro’s first suggested method for implementing his pro-
posal, the reduced rate deductibility method, is a harder treaty-
compatibility case. Under this method, foreign-source business
income would be taxed at a reduced U.S. rate after deducting
foreign taxes from the taxable base. If 65 is the reduced rate (0 /6 / 1), the U.S. tax on $1 of before-foreign-tax foreign-source
business income would be 6581 ' 5∗7. To reach the same result
under a combination of exemption and full credit, the condition9 1 65 4)2∗2)2∗ must be satisfied.162 The problem here is that when5∗ exceeds, within its permissible range (0 + 5∗ / 5 / 1), a cer-
tain value that inversely depends on 6, the credit portion 9
would exit its permissible range (0 + 9 + 1) and exceed one.163
That is, reduced rate deductibility matches a floating combina-
tion of exemption and credit for any foreign tax rate that ranges
from zero up to a ceiling that inversely depends on the applicable
reduced U.S. rate (65). This result makes sense. Because a credit
161. . 19 ' .855∗ 1 985 ' 5∗7 ⇔ 9 1 .4*).,02∗2)2∗ .162. 6581 ' 5∗7 1 985 ' 5∗7 ⇔ 9 1 65 4)2∗2)2∗.163. Because 0 + 5∗ / 5 / 1, the fraction 4)2∗2)2∗ is always greater than one andincreasing in 5∗. Therefore, the value for 5∗ at which 9 1 65 4)2∗2)2∗ exceeds oneinversely depends on 6.
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system reduces the home-country tax liability by foreign taxes
on a dollar-for-dollar basis, Shaviro describes such a system as
having a 100 percent “marginal reimbursement rate” (“MRR”)
for foreign taxes.164 As Shaviro notes, however, the MRR for
standard exemption or deduction systems is the marginal tax
rate (“MTR”), which in the case of exemption is zero.165 Now, to
understand the reduced rate deductibility method, consider first
a straightforward combination of exemption and deduction. Un-
der such a system, the exempt portion of foreign-source income
is not subject to U.S. taxation, but a U.S. tax at the full rate is
imposed on the remaining taxable portion of foreign-source in-
come, determined on an after-foreign-tax basis. The deduction
for foreign taxes will have the same effect taken either before or
after the bifurcation into the exempt and taxable portions. If the
deduction is taken after the bifurcation, however, only the allo-
cable portion of foreign taxes should be allowed as a deduction
from the taxable portion.166 Reduced rate deductibility has the
exact same effect: applying a reduced rate to all income is alge-
braically identical to applying a full rate to part of the income.167
Therefore, because reduced rate deductibility is effectively a
combination of exemption and deduction (with full rate) in pro-
portion to the reduction in the U.S. tax rate, reduced rate de-
ductibility causes the overall MRR to be somewhere between
zero (the MRR of the exemption portion) and the full MTR (the
MRR of the deductibility portion). A combination of exemption
and credit, however, sets the MRR somewhere between zero (the
MRR of the exemption portion) and 100 percent (the MRR of the
credit portion). As a result, the MRRs of these two combinations
164. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 9, at 11–12, 49.
165. Id. at 11–12.
166. If, for example, pretax foreign-source income is $100, the foreign tax rate
is $20, and the U.S. tax rate is 35%, a 60%/40% bifurcation may be equally
effected either before or after the deduction of the $20 of foreign taxes. If the
foreign tax deduction is taken first, 60% of the $80 after-foreign-tax amount
(or $48) is exempt and the remaining 40% (or $32) is taxable at the full 35%
rate for a total U.S. tax liability of $11.20. If the bifurcation is done first, 60%
of the $100 before-foreign-tax amount (or $60) is the exempt portion, and the
remaining 40% (or $40) is the taxable portion. Before applying the U.S. tax,
the $8 allocable foreign taxes (40% of $20) are deducted for a taxable amount
of $32 and a total U.S. tax of $11.20.
167. The same U.S. tax result of $11.20 in the example of footnote 166 is
reached by applying a 14% U.S. tax rate (which is 40% of the full 35% rate) to
the $80 amount of after-foreign-tax foreign-source income.
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may or may not match. With a lower tax rate under reduced rate
deductibility, the exemption portion will be higher, the MRR will
be closer to zero, and the potential matching range with the ex-
emption-credit combinations will be greater. An absolute match
occurs only if the reduced rate (05) is zero, but then that would
become a full exemption system. Therefore, reduced rate deduct-
ibility cannot be expressed as a perfect combination of exemption
and full credit in all circumstances. This means that there are
situations in which reduced rate deductibility does not allow a
dollar-for-dollar credit with respect to the fully taxable portion.
These situations are those in which the applicable foreign tax
rates exceed the above-mentioned ceiling.
If reduced rate deductibility is theoretically not treaty compat-
ible, could it still be practically compatible when, for example,
all potential applicable effective foreign tax rates are within the
ceiling? For example, with 5%, 8%, or 10% reduced U.S. tax rates
(05), reduced rate deductibility would perfectly match combina-
tions of exemption and credit up to effective foreign tax rates of
approximately 31%, 29%, and 28%, respectively. If in reality all
relevant effective foreign tax rates were to fall below these ceil-
ings (and that is a question), reduced rate deductibility would
perfectly match exemption and credit combinations within the
actual foreign tax rate range. Would that make the particular
reduced rate deductibility treaty compatible? As noted,168 in re-
jecting the government’s literal approach for determining
whether a foreign tax is creditable, the Supreme Court in PPL
Corp. v. Commissioner treated a onetime backward-looking U.K.
windfall tax as a creditable income tax for U.S. tax purposes be-
cause, for nearly all the companies subject to the tax, the wind-
fall tax was the algebraic equivalent of a creditable income
tax.169 As the Court indicated, however, outliers were ignored in
light of the legal standard of U.S. Treasury regulation §1.901-2
that creditability is an all or nothing determination that turns
on the “predominant character” of a tax.170 Therefore, even
168. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
169. PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 S. Ct. 1897 (2013).
170. The concurring opinion kept open the question of whether the regula-
tion’s all-or-nothing approach means that “a tax’s predominant character must
be as an income tax for all taxpayers,” because the government also seemed to
be taking a contrary position. Id. at 1910.
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though the regulation codified a longstanding common law doc-
trine on creditability,171 the PPL Corp. decision is not sufficient
to support an argument that outliers can be ignored also for
treaty compatibility purposes. Putting the tax-on-value versus
tax-on-income issue aside, it is also doubtful that the Court could
have ignored the outliers in PPL Corp. if the U.K. windfall tax
was not a onetime backward-looking tax. That is so because it is
much harder, if at all possible, to determine ex ante whether an
“outlier” will remain an outlier or become the standard. Such is
the case of the treaty compatibility inquiry of reform proposals.
The treaty inquiry is mainly a forward-looking inquiry, which,
in the case of reduced rate deductibility, would depend on future
effective foreign tax rates.
If, as Shaviro indicates,172 his proposal can be implemented
through Option Z,173 which is a combination of exemption and
full credit, then, based on the analysis of this article, any system
that is or can be expressed as a fixed or floating combination of
exemption and credit could be designed to implement his pro-
posal in a treaty-compatible manner. The bottom line of
Shaviro’s proposal in this context is that (i) each of the effective
U.S. tax rate and theMTR on foreign-source income should prob-
ably be somewhere between zero and the full domestic rate (full
MTR) and (ii) while the MRR should be somewhere between 100
percent and zero, if foreign-source income booked in tax havens
is suspect of in fact being domestic source income, then the MRR
should be somewhere between the MTR and 100 percent.174
Again, any system that is or can be expressed as a perfect fixed
or floating combination of exemption and full credit would have
(i) an MTR between zero (the MTR of the exemption portion) and
the full MTR (the MTR of the full credit portion) and (ii) an MRR
between zero (the MRR of the exemption portion) and 100 per-
cent (the MRR of the full credit portion). Designing the system
to effectively have a sufficient credit portion would bring the
MRR above the MTR, if one so desires.
171. Biddle v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1938); see PPL Corp., 133 S. Ct.
at 1901.
172. See supra note 17.
173. Although not necessarily with the 60%/40% split.
174. Shaviro, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 21.
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D. Full Rate Deductibility
As demonstrated by Warren,175 a foreign tax deduction system
with a full U.S. tax rate is the equivalent of a partial credit sys-
tem in which, limitations aside, a credit is given on less than a
dollar-for-dollar basis. As discussed above, a partial credit would
be a violation of the general credit principle of Article 23(2).
Therefore, a move to such a system, which in any event is not
really suggested by anyone, would not be treaty compatible.
That a U.S. move to a foreign tax deduction system would not
be treaty compatible does not mean that the existing elective for-
eign tax deduction regime is not treaty compatible. As noted,176
§§164(a)(3) and 275(a)(4) allow a taxpayer to take a foreign tax
deduction instead of a foreign tax credit under §901. Because
this foreign tax deduction is elective and the taxpayer may still
choose to take a foreign tax credit instead, the United States is
in full compliance with its treaty obligations to allow a foreign
tax credit.177
III. WHO CARES ANYWAY?
Even if this article is incorrect about the treaty compatibility
of any of the proposals, it seems very unlikely for taxpayers or
treaty partners to object to any such moves. Tax treaties and the
Code have the same status under U.S. law,178 and therefore, gen-
erally, the later-in-time rule applies.179 Although permissible
under U.S. law, overriding a treaty obligation remains a viola-
tion of international law, yet—short of termination—with no
practical remedy.180
175. See generallyWarren, Jr., supra note 10.
176. See supra note 2.
177. See also supra the second paragraph of note 146.
178. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; I.R.C. §§ 894(a), 7852(d).
179. STEINES, supra note 27, at 271–73.
180. Id.; Avi-Yonah, supra note 27. An interesting question is whether a mu-
tual agreement procedure can help an affected taxpayer or the treaty partner
in this context. Theoretically, the U.S. competent authority’s power to reach
any agreement under Article 25 is limited by the Code provision overriding the
treaty. I.R.C. §§ 894(a), 7852(d). Although in practice the Treasury and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are free to deviate from the dictates of the Code
if they do so in favor of the taxpayer (see, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and
the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829
(2012)), an interesting question is whether the Treasury and the IRS, as part
of the executive branch, could or would effectively restore overridden treaties
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If Congress believes, however, that a reform proposal is treaty
compatible, its enactment cannot be a treaty override,181 and an
affected taxpayer could then “challenge” the new law by claiming
treaty benefits or by initiating a mutual agreement procedure
under Article 25’s equivalent of that treaty. But, what are the
taxpayer’s incentives to do so based on the argument that the
reform is not compatible with Article 23(2)? If the taxpayer has
little to no motivation to do so that would also mean that the
harm in a treaty-incompatible reform would be limited to the
very serious harm in any violation of international law, but with-
out any direct harm to the affected taxpayer. That would clearly
be the case with a move to an exemption system if, for whatever
reason, such a move would be considered treaty incompatible.
But, what about the other proposals discussed above?
As combinations of exemption and credit, the reform proposals
discussed herein (other than the exemption proposal) are gener-
ally worse than exemption but better than treaty credit for tax-
payers. Therefore, a taxpayer typically would object only if it
could secure an exemption result, but that is unlikely to happen
because securing an exemption result through Article 23(2)
would require limitations under U.S. law that would not exist at
the time. That leaves the taxpayer with the only possibility of
claiming credit relief under Article 23(2) or its equivalent. But,
in the absence of applicable foreign tax credit Code provisions at
the time, the United States would grant a principle-based for-
eign tax credit under the treaty. Such principle-based relief
would not include the loopholes in the current foreign tax credit
provisions that could make a credit system better for taxpayers
than it should be.182 Therefore, it is highly unlikely for any tax-
payer to object to a move to any of the proposals discussed (ex-
cept for deductibility with the full U.S. rate, an idea that has not
been seriously considered).
through such giveaway deviations. To be sure, a mandatory arbitration proce-
dure, if applicable, is part of the mutual agreement procedure, and an arbitra-
tion resolution would constitute a resolution by mutual agreement and, as a
result, would also be limited by treaty-overriding Code provisions. See U.S.
MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 25, 25(9)(j).
181. Treaty override seems to be permissible under U.S. law only where the
subsequent Code provision or its legislative history clearly indicates an intent
to do so. STEINES, supra note 27, at 272.
182. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni, & Stephen E. Shay,
Worse than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009); Bret Wells, The Foreign Tax
Credit War, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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Again, other than terminating the treaty or (if the specific
treaty includes such a provision) participating in a mutual
agreement procedure that would lead to mandatory arbitration,
there is nothing a treaty partner can unilaterally do about a U.S.
move to any of the proposals discussed. Termination is too dras-
tic an action to be seriously considered,183 and a mutual agree-
ment procedure that could lead to mandatory arbitration is un-
likely to happen because it requires an initiation either by an
affected taxpayer or by another person on a taxpayer-specific ba-
sis. Even if a mutual agreement procedure is initiated by or on
behalf of a taxpayer, the motivation of a treaty partner to object
to any of the reform proposals discussed above is very little. In-
deed, beyond resolving the issue of double taxation, which, as
noted, is nonexistent with respect to the reform proposals dis-
cussed, one reason treaty partners might prefer a U.S. move to
an exemption system may be that such a move could make it
easier for them to attract U.S. foreign direct investment by low-
ering their tax rates.184 But, even in that case, other considera-
tions would still diminish the treaty partner’s incentives to pur-
sue a U.S. exemption result. First, the chances of success are
slim. Second, a U.S. move to an exemption system may, contrary
to their interests, force foreign countries to race to the bottom.
Third, a U.S. move from any of the proposals to an exemption
system with a zero MRR would increase U.S. taxpayers’ cost-
consciousness with respect to foreign taxes, including the treaty
partner’s taxes.185 Fourth, mutual agreement procedure resolu-
tions, including mandatory arbitration determinations, have no
precedential value and are not even published, thereby making
a resolution’s effect on future foreign direct investment question-
able at best. With some opposed interests and slim chances to
183. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 27.
184. Joel Slemrod, Effect of Taxation with International Capital Mobility, in
UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 115
(Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper, & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1988).
185. Generally, taxpayers are more cost-conscious with respect to their for-
eign taxes under a home-country exemption system than they are under a
home-country credit system without deferral. See SHAVIRO, supra note 9, at 51–
53; Fadi Shaheen, On Fixing U.S. International Taxation, 9 JRSLM. REV. LEGAL
STUD. 125, 128–30 (2014). Because all proposals discussed above would also
eliminate deferral, the smaller the credit component in any proposal that com-
bines exemption and credit the more cost-conscious U.S. taxpayers would be
with respect to their foreign taxes.
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reach a desired result, taxpayers’ and treaty partners’ motiva-
tions to object to any of the reform proposals discussed are seem-
ingly negligible.
CONCLUSION
This article addresses the treaty compatibility aspect of pro-
posals for reforming the U.S. international tax system. Finding
that a reform proposal is treaty compatible obviates the need for
renegotiating or overriding existing U.S. treaties to implement
the proposal if enacted. After establishing that a U.S. move to
an exemption system would be treaty compatible despite the lit-
eral reading of Article 23 of the U.S. Model Treaty as requiring
a credit system, the article argues that any system that is or can
be expressed as an outright fixed or floating combination of ex-
emption and credit is treaty compatible regardless of how it is
actually labeled or expressed. Article 23(2) of the U.S. Model
Treaty subjects the U.S. credit obligation to limitations of U.S.
law as may be amended without changing the general principle
of Article 23(2). The argument of this article is that any tax sys-
tem that is or can be expressed as an outright fixed or floating
combination of exemption and credit is treaty compatible be-
cause such a system is but a post-treaty amendment that does
not change the general principle of Article 23(2)—namely, the
principle of allowing a dollar-for-dollar reduction (but not below
zero) in the amount of U.S. tax on U.S.-taxable foreign-source
income by the amount of foreign taxes paid, which can be applied
on an overall basis, item-by-item basis, or any basis in between.
The article also algebraically demonstrates, by employing a uni-
form method, that most recent proposals for reforming the U.S.
international tax system are, or can be expressed as, perfect
fixed or floating combinations of exemption and credit, and
therefore are treaty compatible. The article then explains why it
is unlikely that taxpayers or treaty partners would object to the
enactment of any such proposals even if they were not treaty
compatible.
